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The digital information environment functions today as the backbone of democracies.  This 
environment is operated by online intermediaries that control the flow of information and 
monitor content running through their “pipelines.”  Thus far, content monitoring has been 
conducted with almost no regulation and according to the intermediaries’ own (commercial) 
policies.  In that respect, online intermediaries have become, in fact, the online rulers.  Therefore, 
the issue of online content monitoring stands at the heart of contemporary social and legal 
discourse, since it challenges other public, individual, or commercial entities’ constitutional rights 
and freedoms, such as freedom of speech, or more broadly, other “digital human rights.” 
Online rulers are facing a new legal and social challenge, since they are the ones expected to strike 
the appropriate constitutional balance, although they are private-commercial entities.  This reality 
can be demonstrated through different practices concerning content monitoring in cases of 
alleged copyright infringement, such as the legal schemes of “notice and takedown” or “blocking 
orders.”  Online rulers are expected to act as gatekeepers for the sake of public interest—but 
without any legal infrastructure. 
Against this backdrop, the article aims to explore whether and how some of the basic public law 
standards, such as accountability, transparency, equality, and reasoning, could be imposed on 
relevant online rulers.  European countries, in contrast to the U.S., are more willing to accept the 
introduction of public law standards into the private law sphere.  According to an accepted 
doctrine, in some cases private entities may be perceived as a hybrid private/public body, and as 
a result the door opens for the direct imposition of some public law standards on such private 
entities.  This article proposes that in relevant cases major online rulers should be acknowledged 
as hybrid bodies, in order to promote a balanced and fair digital information environment.  There 
are many advantages in using this doctrine, which allows a gradual and dynamic application of 
public law principles, and on a global scale.  The challenge for such potential legal move in the 
U.S. is greater, considering the current interpretation of the “state action doctrine,” which hinders 
the application of constitutional rights in the private sphere.  Nevertheless, this current judicial 
restrictive approach could be relaxed by further future judicial elaborations.  The significance of 
this article, therefore, lies in its potential to assist in shaping better policies and practices in the 
future that can and should be initiated by the U.S. judiciary. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Today the state is not the sole source of sovereignty, since its rule is shared 
not just with supra-state authorities but also with powerful private entities.
1
  
This is particularly evident in the current digital environment, which is 
operated and governed by a few super-corporations, such as the Big Five 
technology firms.
2
  This article explores the questions of whether some public 
law norms, which bind the state, should be imposed on these private entities 
governing the digital sphere, and moreover, how such legal moves can be 
achieved. 
The digital sphere is operated by a pyramid of “in-between” actors, known 
as Internet or online intermediaries.  These intermediaries include the 
physical network access providers (ISPs) and various online services providers, 
such as search engines, content platforms, and social media networks.
3
  The 
structure of the digital environment has changed the way information is 
produced, used, and disseminated: All layers are involved with the traffic of 
information, whereas the platforms at the upper layer are also engaged in 
curation of the content.
4
  Therefore, while the various online intermediaries 
may be different in regard to the degree of their involvement in the 
dissemination and curation of information (i.e. some would be regarded more 
passive and others more active), all intermediaries nevertheless play a 
 
1 DAN JERKER B. SVANTESSON, INTERNET & JURISDICTION GLOBAL STATUS REPORT 2019, 
INTERNET & JURISDICTION POL’Y NETWORK (2019), at 49, available at 
https://www.internetjurisdiction.net/uploads/pdfs/GSR2019/Internet-Jurisdiction-Global-Status-
Report-2019_web.pdf (citing E. Weitzenboeck, Hybrid Net: The Regulatory Framework of ICANN 
and the DNS, 22 INT’L J. L. INFO. TECH. 49, 68 (2014) (“[T]he state ceases to be the sole source of 
sovereignty. . . .”). 
 2 The Big Five multinational technology companies in terms of market capital 
are  Apple, Amazon, Alphabet (holding company for Google), Microsoft, and Facebook.  Katie 
Jones, The Big Five: Largest Acquisitions by Tech Company, VISUAL CAPITALIST (Oct. 11, 2019), 
https://www.visualcapitalist.com/the-big-five-largest-acquisitions-by-tech-company/.  See also Rory 
Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1269 (2017) (arguing that digital 
intermediaries, in the context of commercial markets, regulate “by influencing behavior in ways 
similar to public actors”); How 5 Tech Giants Have Become More Like 
Governments Than Companies, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2
017/10/26/560136311/how-5-tech-giants-have-become-more-like-governments-than-
companies?t=1558819996409 (reflecting “New York Times tech columnist Farhad Manjoo 
warn[ing] that the ‘frightful five’—Amazon, Google, Apple, Microsoft and Facebook—are collectively 
more powerful than many governments”). 
 3 See STEFAN KULK, INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES AND COPYRIGHT LAW: EU AND US 
PERSPECTIVES, 10–11 (2019) (discussing “in-between” actors). 
 4 See id. at 17–21 (discussing the history of the internet and copyright law).  
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significant role in the operation of the current digital environment.  The 
intermediaries are involved in the flow of information at all layers of the digital 
sphere’s pyramid, and thus they function as the “valves” that control the traffic 
of content in their respective “pipelines.”  In that respect, these online 
intermediaries are in fact online rulers. 
In the 1990s, digital technological and social development was celebrated 
as a facilitator for a utopian democracy.
5
  Two decades later, the fear in 
democratic states of the ill-consequences of centralized control of online rulers 
over the digital sphere has taken over.
6
  Online rulers, being commercial 
entities, are free to monitor the information flow in their pipelines; they are 
free to remove content as they deem fit; they may block access to content or 
sites at their own will.  Thus far, legal attempts to claim that these online rulers 
are subject to some “must-carry” obligations, i.e. they cannot remove content 
or block access at their own will, considering their major role in the digital 
speech environment, has failed.
7
  Moreover, since the digital speech 
environment has replaced the press and other traditional media as well as 
traditional fora such as parks, market squares, and shopping malls, the basic 
questions of freedom of speech are still valid: Should we as a society tolerate 
any digital speech?  Should the digital dissemination of harmful content be 
banned and in what manner?  Should uninvolved third parties be held liable 
for not banning the flow of illegal digital speech and infringing content or, by 
the same token, be held liable for banning such flow?  Clearly, one of the most 
urgent legal challenges that democratic states currently face is designing the 




 5 See Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Global Platform Governance: Private Power in the Shadow of the State, 
72 SMU L. REV. 27, 33–38 (2019) (reviewing the early utopian trend in scholarly writing regarding 
the internet). 
 6 See DAPHNE KELLER, HOOVER INST., WHO DO YOU SUE? STATE AND PLATFORM HYBRID 
POWER OVER ONLINE SPEECH (Aegis Series Paper No. 1902) (2019) (detailing the broad discretion 
of online platforms and their ability to remove speech from their platforms). 
 7 Id. at 11–13. 
 8 Online platforms’ liability for hate speech or encouragement of violence stood at the heart of a 
massive public debate in May–June 2020, when Twitter labeled President Trump’s online messages 
as potentially ‘false’ or as ‘glorifying violence.’  President Trump perceived this move as an ‘editorial 
decision,’ which hinders freedom of speech.  Maggie Haberman & Kate Conger, Trump Signs 
Executive Order on Social Media, Claiming to Protect ‘Free Speech’, N.Y. TIMES (last updated June 
2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/28/us/politics/trump-order-social-media.html.  
Following these events, in June 2020, massive public pressure was put on Facebook to follow 
Twitter’s move and to adopt a new proactive policy monitoring speech which encourages violence.  
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This article argues that since all online rulers serve as potential gatekeepers 
for access and participation in the global digital fora, a set of public law norms, 
such as quasi-administrative legal obligations, should be imposed on them in 
order to guarantee the protection of Digital Human Rights.  In order to explain 
this stance, first the notion of Digital Human Rights will be presented.  This 
discussion serves as the basis for the proposition that public law norms should 
be stretched into the private sphere, as it describes both the acknowledgment 
of these new (or nuanced) human rights and the risk to their fulfillment caused 
by content monitoring practices conducted by major online rulers.  There are 
different content monitoring practices in the U.S. and Europe; however, both 
present a challenge to Digital Human Rights.  Then, the article will turn to 
discuss the major legal obstacle to such a move, at least in the U.S., which 
stems from the fact that online rulers are private corporations.  While 
European legal tradition is more sympathetic to the introduction of human 
rights standards into the private sector by horizontal application, the American 
counterpart is generally hostile to such legal moves.  Therefore, the imposition 
of human rights standards on private entities should overcome the legal 
obstacle of the private/public law divide.  For this aim, the doctrine of “hybrid 
private/public bodies” will be presented.  According to this accepted doctrine, 
in some cases private entities, such as commercial companies that serve a 
social function in nature, may be perceived as hybrid private/public bodies.
9
  
The legal consequence stemming from such perception is that the door opens 
for the direct imposition of public law standards on the relevant private entity.  
We will propose that in relevant cases major online rulers should be 
acknowledged as hybrid bodies, in order to promote a balanced and fair digital 
information environment. 
The advantage of applying the hybrid bodies doctrine to online rulers lies 
exactly in its dynamic nature.  The acknowledgment of an online ruler as a 
hybrid body is only the starting point for the substantial discussion as to which 
quasi-administrative principles should be applied and to what extent.  It 
 
Rachel Lerman & Craig Timberg, Bowing to Pressure, Facebook Will Start Labeling Violating Posts 
from Politicians. But Critics Say It’s Not 
Enough, WASH. POST (June 27, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/06/26/fa
cebook-hate-speech-policies.  These events, and the public outcry, demonstrate the importance of 
imposing the appropriate legal governance on online rulers. 
9  See, e.g., Human Rights Act 1998, c.42 § 6(1) (UK); Aharon Barak, Constitutional Human Rights 
and Private Law, 3 REV. CONST. STUD. 218, (1996).   
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certainly does not imply a “must-carry” obligation but rather a set of norms 
that should govern the process of decision making, such as: transparency, 
giving reason, equality, and any kind of judicial review.  These major factors 
would make the online ruler accountable to its operation, on a procedural 
level.  The creation of legal governance over the decision-making process of 
online rulers may generate the needed guarantees for adequate protection of 
Digital Human Rights and at the same time preserve the online rulers’ 
adequate freedoms in conducting their own business,
10
 thus preserving some 
core net-neutrality.
11
  The development of governance principles for online 
rulers should be made cautiously, since it should balance complex interests 
and accommodate rapidly changing technologies and social reality.  The 
hybrid bodies doctrine allows such gradual development, since it does not rule 
on the outcome (remove/don’t remove content) but only moves, in part, the 
procedural parts of the operation of the digital environment into the public 
law sphere. 
The potential role of the hybrid bodies doctrine will be demonstrated with 
respect to the issue of allegedly copyright infringing content that the various 
Internet operators are requested to remove or block.  While such a request 
may be justified by the copyright holders’ wish to prevent economic injury, 
when such removal or block eventually takes down legal content it harms users 
— and in fact the public at large.  In other words, content monitoring may 
injure the public’s Digital Human Rights.  Therefore, in order to properly 
protect both sides’ legitimate interests, a quasi-administrative legal framework 
may ease the tension, where the online ruler cannot be an indifferent 
intermediary, and where it should operate in accordance to some basic public 
law principles that would ensure that there are no biased, capricious, or 
unreasonable decisions made. 
 
 10 See Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, Google First Amendment Protection for Search Engine 
Search Results, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 883, 886 (2012) (reflecting that, in the U.S., the online 
platforms should enjoy basic freedoms as well, such as freedom of speech).  Similarly, the European 
Court of Justice (EUCJ) has acknowledged a basic right to conduct a business freely.  Case C-70/10 
Scarlet Extended SA v. Société Belge des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Éditeurs SCRL (SABAM), 2011 
(Scarlet Extended case); Case C-360/10 Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en 
Uitgevers (SABAM) v. Netlog NV, 2012 (the SABAM cases). 
 11 For a critical description of the net-neutrality approach, see Kristen E. Eichensehr, Digital 
Switzerlands, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 665 (2019) (describing the U.S. technology companies as “digital 
Switzerlands” because they are not completely regulated by their host nation and are “neutral”). 
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This article will proceed as follows: Part II will shortly describe the 
centrality of online rulers in current society and explore the notion of Digital 
Human Rights.  Part III will delve into the issue of content monitoring, by 
describing current practices in the U.S. and in Europe, explaining the 
problems stemming from such practices to Digital Human Rights, and 
identifying the legal divide between the public and private spheres as a barrier 
to the adoption of a legal mechanism that may ease the conflict created by 
content monitoring.  Part IV will focus on the public/private divide by 
describing the American state action doctrine, which preserves a dichotomic 
perception, and by describing other contemporary approaches that claim that 
the divide is blurred, and public law norms have long percolated into the 
private sphere.  Then, the doctrine of hybrid bodies, which allows the 
imposition of public law obligation on private entities, will be presented.  Part 
V ties up both ends: It presents the stance that major online rulers should be 
perceived in relevant cases as hybrid bodies, and it demonstrates this view with 
respect to allegedly copyright infringing content monitoring mechanisms. 
I. ONLINE RULERS AND DIGITAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
A. The Role of Online Rulers in the Digital Age 
The digital environment has generated what is known in scholarly writing 
as the age of “information society.”
12
  The dissemination of information, 
thereby of knowledge and ideas, through digital technologies has created a 
major societal leap and a paradigm shift, in Kuhnian terms.
13
  The emergence 
of the Internet and its early days were accompanied by  a utopian sentiment 
concerning a free and purely democratic sphere that would allow for 
uncontrolled speech and social engagement.
14
  In recent years, however, there 
has been a growing understanding that the digital environment faces crucial 
 
 12 See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS 
MARKETS AND FREEDOM 1–6, 27 (2006) (detailing the changes in technology, economy, and 
society). 
 13 THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970); see also 
BENKLER, supra note 13 (reflecting further on the societal changes brought on by digital 
technologies). 
 14 Bloch-Wehba, supra note 5, at 27, 33–38.  
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obstacles that prevent the accomplishment of such ideals.
15
  The obstacles vary 
with respect to various online actors in the different layers of the digital 
sphere’s pyramid; however, there is one basic shared problem stemming from 
the fact that all online rulers are privately owned commercial corporations. 
If we inspect the uppermost layer of the digital sphere’s pyramid, 
containing online platforms, speech in this digital layer has indeed “created a 
global democratic culture.”
16
  Various social media platforms, such as 
Facebook, YouTube, and WhatsApp, are examples of major online 
platforms.  These major online platforms function as the current market 
square, yet on a global scale.
17
  Online platforms provide essential public 
needs, such as the “place” in which individuals may access information, 
express themselves, and thereby enjoy access to and engage with the social and 
cultural life of their communities.
18
  Yet, although the services online platforms 
provide became a backbone of the public civil experience, they are 
nevertheless operated by privately owned commercial corporations.  
Moreover, the market of online platforms is currently centralized, held by a 
few mega corporations that are highly dominant in the relevant market 
segment.
19





15  See Bloch-Wehba, supra note 5, at 35 )describing the various realistic responses to the early utopian 
approach); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from Liberal 
Democratic Theory, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 395, 403 (2000) (arguing that regulating the cybersphere 
will become inevitable in order to maintain basic liberal democratic norms). 
 16 Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 
131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1664 (2018); see also Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic 
Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 34–
35 (2004) (stressing the important role of digital speech for the participation of people in a democratic 
culture).  
 17 See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017) (citation omitted) (reflecting that 
these platforms “allow a person with an Internet connection to ‘become a town crier with a voice that 
resonates farther than it could from any soapbox’”).  This case is further discussed below in Part II.B. 
 18 See Evelyn Mary Aswad, The Future of Freedom of Expression Online, 17 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 
26, 31 (2018) (detailing the view of the United States Supreme Court that social media and cyberspace 
is “one of the most important places to exchange views”). 
 19 See Katie Jones, The Big Five: Largest Acquisitions by Tech Company, VISUAL CAPITALIST (Oct. 
11, 2019), https://www.visualcapitalist.com/the-big-five-largest-acquisitions-by-tech-company/ 
(outlining the dominance of the Big Five tech companies, Microsoft, Apple, Amazon, Alphabet 
(Google), and Facebook). 
 20 See Aswad, supra note 18, at 30 (suggesting that this reality may fit the coined notion of a “neo-
medieval” social structure, in which non-state actors, such as feudal owner of properties, govern). 
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If we inspect the lower layer of the digital sphere’s pyramid, we may reach 
similar conclusions.  The access to the digital sphere is operated by digital 
infrastructure bodies, i.e. the ISPs, a term which refers to a wide range of 
access facilitators.
21
  These bodies function as the “pipelines” of the democratic 
digital environment, and as such they also operate its “valves.”  Therefore, in 
fact, ISPs control both the flow of information and the access to the 
information environment.  Yet, ISPs are private corporations as well, therefore 
the “pipelines” of democracy are run by the private sector. 
One may say that this is not a new phenomenon, since in the pre-digital 
era the press and traditional broadcasting media could have been described as 
the backbone of democracy as well, and most of these vehicles are also 
privately owned.
22
  Thus, to a certain extent, it could be argued that the issue 
of the role of online platforms and ISPs is nothing more than “old wine in new 
bottles.”  However, the old speech vehicles were mainly local, with much less 
exposure and thereby dominancy in comparison to current online platforms.
23
  
The online platforms have created not only a global, supra-state, democratic 
fora, but in some communities their services are assimilated to the “Internet” 
itself.
24
  Indeed, it is a matter of degree.  In other words, online platforms’ 
global reach and dominancy presents a new legal challenge.  The extreme size 
and power of some online platforms should play a major role in designing new 
 
 21 The ISPs’ function includes the basic physical network providers (such as cable companies) and 
Internet access providers, which may be carried by cable companies or mobile companies. See Kulk, 
supra note 3, at 10–11 (discussing internet intermediaries). 
 22 For the press and media power and ownership in the pre-digital era, see Daniel L. Brenner, 
Ownership and Content Regulation in Merging and Emerging Media, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 1009 
(1996) (describing the private ownership of various press and media in the U.S. and discussing the 
negative and positive consequences stemming from mergers that would create mega media 
corporations); C. Edwin Baker, Media Concentration: Giving up on Democracy, 54 FLA. L. REV. 
839, 902–19 (2002) (describing the private and concentrated ownership of major media in the U.S. 
and the potential harm to free speech); L. P. Hitchens, Media Ownership and Control: A European 
Approach, 57 MOD. L. REV. 585 (1994) (describing the British and European private ownership 
structure of mass media). 
 23 Brenner, supra note 22, at 1011 (“The old electronic marketplace of fifteen years ago, dominated by 
the three television networks and their affiliated stations, is a substantial but not dominant portion of 
the electronic landscape. Programmers and distributors view the market as worldwide, not 
domestic.”). 
 24 See Leo Mirani, Millions of Facebook Users Have No Idea They’re Using the Internet, QUARTZ 
(Feb. 9, 2015), https://qz.com/333313/milliions-of-facebook-users-have-no-idea-theyre-using-the-
internet/.  According to this non-academic research, a very high percentage of people, especially in 
developing countries, such as Nigeria and Indonesia, use Facebook and believe that Facebook is the 
Internet.  One of the proposed reasons for such reality is that in some of these countries Facebook 
is the major or even only free and accessible platform. 
360 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 23:2 
   
 
legal measures aimed at accommodating the new legal challenges.  
Furthermore, the online platforms enjoy new characteristics stemming from 
the technology, such as the unlimited capacity of curation of information, 
which generates new legal challenges.  Moreover, the ISP’s role cannot be 
compared with that of the traditional media, since their control is over the 
communication infrastructures.  Therefore, ISPs should be resembled to the 
role of broadcasting signals, which are usually regulated by the state.
25
 
In many cases, some basic needs are covered by the private sector; 
however, the fact that the private sector is not only the sole operator of the 
democratic digital environment but is also controlled by a handful of major, 
dominant corporations leads to a conflict with protected human rights.   
B. Digital Human Rights 
Freedom of speech, that is protected under the U.S. Constitution’s First 
Amendment,
26
 includes both active acts of expression and access to 
information, which are acknowledged as protected human rights.
27
  On an 
International Law level, freedom of speech is proclaimed and guaranteed both 
under the Universal Declaration of Human rights and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, safeguarding “the right to hold opinions 
without interference” and “the right to seek, receive, and impart information 
and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers” and through any medium.
28
 
Access to cultural life is an acknowledged human right as well.  Article 27 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that “everyone has 
 
 25 The Federal Communications Commission regulates communications by radio, television, wire, 
satellite, and cable in the U.S.  What We Do, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/about-
fcc/what-we-do (last visited Oct. 20, 2020); see also 47 C.F.R. §§ 1–1513 (2020) (setting forth the 
statutory regulations in the United States). 
 26 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
27  See FREDERICH SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 15-86 (1982) (explaining 
the multi-facet aspects of free speech); see also Roy Peled & Yoram Rabin, The Constitutional Right 
to Information, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 357, 360 (2011) ("[T]he right to information is a 
precondition for the exercise of procedural political rights, such as the freedom of expression."). 
 28 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 19, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone 
has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions 
without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and 
regardless of frontiers.”); G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) art. 19(2), International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (Mar. 29, 1967) (“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right 
shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of 
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his 
choice.”). 
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the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community.”
29
  This 
human right was further anchored in Article 15(1) of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which states that “the 
States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone: (a) To 
take part in cultural life.”
30
  The U.S. is not a party to the Covenant; however, 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights may represent customary 
international law norms,
31
 or at least a source of inspiration for accepted moral 
standards.
32
  Various international law instruments assist in clarifying the 
content and boundaries of this cultural human right.
33
  A comprehensive 
clarification can be found in a U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization recommendation from 1986, according to which the right 
embraces two key elements: 1. Access to Culture, defined as “the concrete 
opportunities available to everyone, in particular through the creation of the 
appropriate socio-economic conditions, for freely obtaining information, 
training, knowledge, and understanding, and for enjoying cultural values and 
cultural property”; 2. Participation in Cultural Life, defined as “the concrete 
opportunities guaranteed for all—groups or individuals—to express themselves 
freely, to act, and engage in creative activities with a view to the full 
development of their personalities, a harmonious life, and the cultural 
progress of society.”
34
  Clearly, the right to participate in cultural life is a 
nuanced subset of freedom of speech, encompassing both passive and active 
perspectives;
35
 however, it focuses on the democratic cultural sphere.  This 
 
 29 G.A. Res. 217, supra note 28, at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948)  
30 G.A. Res. 2200, supra note 28, at 45, (Dec. 16, 1966). 
31    See PAUL SEIGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 14–19 (1983) (discussing the 
history and structure of modern international human rights laws); see also Hurst Hannum, The Status 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 287, 298, 301, 304–07, 322–24 (1995) (positing that the Universal Declaration has become 
part of customary international law). 
32    See HENRY J. STEINER, PHILIP ALSTON, & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS, TEXT AND MATERIALS 138–39 (3d ed. 2000) (describing how 
the Universal Declaration is perceived as the prime document and constitution of the human rights 
movement, with a symbolic and ideological status). 
33 See Orit Fischman-Afori, Human Rights and Copyright: The Introduction of Natural Law 
Considerations into American Copyright Law, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 497 
(2004) (analyzing these legal instruments). 
34 UNESCO, Rep. of Programme Commiss’n II, annex, Recommendation on Participation by the 
People at Large in Cultural Life and Their Contribution to It, 19th Sess., I.2, 31 (Nov. 26, 1976). 
 35 Fischman-Afori, supra note 33, at 514. 
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right is highly relevant in the current digital environment.
36
  Particular attention 
has been given recently to the right to participate in cultural life in its current 
phase, the right to participate in digital cultural life and digital discourse, which 
in other words has evolved into Digital Human Rights.  Digital Human Rights, 
therefore, include digital freedom of speech and its sub-branch of digital 
cultural rights.  It should be noted that Digital Human Rights concern 
additional aspects, such as privacy; however, these fall outside the scope of this 
article.      
In a gradual process, the U.N. has stressed the importance of this new 
phase of Digital Human Rights.  Already in 1993, the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights established the mandate of the Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression.  The mandate was extended periodically, and special 
reports were submitted along the years.
37
  One of its significant milestones, the 
Special Rapporteur report on the promotion and protection of the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression, submitted in 2011, has declared that 
Internet access, in general, should be perceived as a human right and as part 
of the freedom of speech.
38
  The report included many concrete 
recommendations aimed to secure access to the Internet for all, which will be 
further explored in this article.
39
  Thereafter, following reports elaborated 
various aspects of Digital Human Rights, including another significant report 
submitted in 2018 that focused on online content regulation.
40
  Moreover, in 
2016, the United Nations Human Rights Council released a nonbinding 
resolution condemning disruption of Internet access by governments, which 
 
36 See Lea Shaver & Caterina Sganga, The Right to Take Part in Cultural Life: On Copyright and 
Human Rights, 27 WISC. INT’L. L.J. 637, 638 (2009) (proposing to frame the movements for further 
freedom of speech on the Internet in terms of human rights); see also Kitsuron Sangsuvan, Balancing 
Freedom of Speech on the Internet Under International Law, 39 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 701, 
703, 706 (2014) (discussing the importance of freedom of speech on the internet). 
37 Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Freedom of Opinion and Expression, 
OHCHR, https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/freedomopinion/pages/opinionindex.aspx (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2020). 
 38 Frank La Rue (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression) Special Rep., ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/27, (May 16, 2011) (“[T]he 
Internet has become a key means by which individuals can exercise their right to freedom of opinion 
and expression.”). 
 39 Id.  See also infra part II.C. 
40 Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion 
and Expression, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/38/35 (July 6, 2018). 
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further anchored the right to Internet access as a basic human right.
41
  
Following this path, in January 2020 the Indian Supreme Court ruled that the 
long Internet access ban in Jammu and Kashmir, which had been presented 
by the government as a needed measure to fight terror, violated the Indian 
constitutional right to freedom of speech and expression.
42
 
In the U.S., similar evolvement took place when the importance of Digital 
(Human) Rights was stressed in a gradual process.
43
  A highlight of this process 
was when, in 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court, in its decision in the case of 
Packingham v. North Carolina, acknowledged access to online social media 
(such as Facebook) as part of the right to freedom of speech.
44
  Therefore, the 
Court struck down state legislation that prevented convicted criminals from 
accessing social media, as it violated constitutional First Amendments rights.
45
  
This seminal decision placed the issue of regulating online platforms at the 
heart of the Digital Human Rights discourse.  In other words, one of the major 
arenas in which the doctrine of Digital Human Rights should operate is that 
of social and cultural activities taking place over online platforms, being the 
contemporary market square.  Yet, as it will be further explored below, 
guaranteeing Digital Human Rights leads to a major problem: Human Rights 
impose obligations on states, while online platforms are commercial-private 
entities.  The question, therefore, is whether some public law obligations may 
nevertheless be imposed on the private sector as well, and if yes, then how. 
 
 41 Human Rights Council A/HRC/32/L.20 (June 30, 2016). 
42 See Writ Petition, Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India and Ors. (civil) No. 1031 of 2019 ¶ 
152(b)(c) (2020) (“[T]he freedom of speech and expression and the freedom to practice any 
profession or carry on any trade, business or occupation over the medium of internet enjoys 
constitutional protection under Article 19(1)(a) and Article 19 (1) (g).  The restriction upon such 
fundamental rights should be in consonance with the mandate under Article 19 (2) and (6) of the 
Constitution, inclusive of the test of proportionality.  An order suspending internet services 
indefinitely is impermissible under the Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services (Public 
Emergency or Public Service) Rules, 2017, Suspension can be utilized for temporary duration only.”). 
 43 For scholarly works describing and analyzing this process, see Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-
School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2296, 2298 (2016); Klonick, supra note 16, at 1613–
15.  For an early acknowledgment of Digital Human Rights, see Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil 
Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV 61, 95–97, 99–103, 115–25 (2009). 
44  Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017). 
45 Id.  (“[T]o foreclose access to social media altogether is to prevent the user from engaging in the 
legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights. . . .  Even convicted criminals—and in some instances 
especially convicted criminals—might receive legitimate benefits from these means for access to the 
world of ideas, in particular if they seek to reform and to pursue lawful and rewarding lives.”).  
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II. ONLINE RULERS AND CONTENT MONITORING 
A. General Background 
In contrast to the early utopian views of the digital environment as an 
unregulated arena accomplishing the democratic freedom of speech ideal,
46
 
the traffic of information and content, thereby of speech, is monitored by 
various Internet actors, i.e. both ISPs and online platforms.  This is what Jack 
Balkin has described as the “new-school speech regulation,” which comprises 
“techniques that regulate speech through the control of digital networks.”
47
  
The various online intermediaries may monitor content and remove it in 
accordance with various legal schemes.  Exploring these schemes allows us to 
better understand the challenges Digital Human Rights face. 
The legal schemes for content removal could be classified into certain 
categories.  One such classification differentiates between content removal due 
to violation of the online intermediary’s contractual terms, which is voluntary 
removal of content, and content removal conducted due to imposed 
regulation, which is nonvoluntary removal.  The classification of content 
monitoring according to whether it was conducted voluntarily or 
nonvoluntarily is not sensitive enough to some further ramifications.  
Voluntary removal of content may also be classified according to the initial 
motivation: Some voluntary content removal is generated by commercial 
contractual terms originally set by the platform operator, whereas others may 
be initiated by public discourse and public activities that encouraged, or rather 
compelled, the platform to adopt a higher standard of content filtering.
48
  
Moreover, some of the seemingly voluntary policies adopted by online 
platforms are a result of a fear or a threat of upcoming legislation.
49
  A common 
 
 46 See Benkler, supra note 12 and accompanying text (explaining how technology can lead to great 
societal change).  
 47 Balkin, supra note 43, at 2306. 
 48 See Klonick, supra note 16, at 1664 (concluding that “platforms are economically responsive to the 
expectations and norms of their users”); see also REBECCA MACKINNON, ANDI WILSON, & LIZ 
WOOLERY, OPEN TECH INST., INTERNET FREEDOM AT A CROSSROADS: RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR THE 45TH PRESIDENT’S INTERNET FREEDOM AGENDA12 (2016) (describing how American 
corporations have responded to government pressure by amending their terms of service). 
 49 See Danielle Keats Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, and Censorship Creep, 93 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1047 (2018) (noting that even if EU lawmakers describe changes in 
private speech practices as “voluntary,” in fact they are generated by governmental intervention); 
Aswad, supra note 18, at 42–70 (discussing the adoption of codes of conduct against hate speech by 
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legal mechanism used to promote the adoption of further voluntary terms is a 
“code of conduct,” which is a self-regulation tool.
50
  The most well-known 
example for such a code of conduct relates to the removal of illegal hate 
speech.  The European Union Commission have crafted a recommended 
code of conduct, which was voluntarily adopted by major online platforms.
51
  
This last example demonstrates the complexity of self-regulation measures, 
which are not made of the same cloth: Some may reflect a self-serving need, 
while others may reflect social regulation implemented by sophisticated 
bottom-up mechanisms.
52
  In other words, self-regulation, known also as “soft 
law,” may function as a useful substitute to traditional regulation imposing 
duties on private actors.
53
 
Nonvoluntary content removal, in contrast, may be generated by coercive 
legislation or by a court order, based on either criminal law grounds,
54
 or on 
civil law grounds, such as the one aimed at preventing the dissemination of 
copyright infringing content.
55
  This last court order, known as a “blocking 
order,” and the American and European regulated schemes for allegedly 
copyright infringing content monitoring, will be further described in part III B 
bellow. 
 
major online corporations to meet the standards proposed by the UN); see also Bloch-Wehba, supra 
note 5, at 46–47 (discussing how arrangements between governments and social media companies 
have become increasingly less voluntary over time). 
50 For the function of “codes of conduct” or “codes of best practices” as a self-regulation tool, see Julia 
Black, Decentering Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a ‘Post-
Regulatory’ World, 54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 103 (2001).  In recent scholarly works, there is a 
growing inspection of various types of self-ordering and their social function.  See, e.g., Ira P. Robbins, 
Best Practices on Best Practices: Legal Education and Beyond, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 269, 289 (2009); 
Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 
159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 423 (2011). 
51 See VERA JOUROVÁ, EUR. COMM’N, CODE OF CONDUCT ON COUNTERING ILLEGAL HATE 
SPEECH ONLINE: FIRST RESULTS ON IMPLEMENTATION (2016) (describing the adoption of the 
code). 
52 See Black, supra note 50, at 115 (explaining that for some, self-regulation denotes a kind of regulation 
that is “responsive, flexible, informed, targeted, which prompts greater compliance, and which at 
once stimulates and draws on the internal morality of the sector or organization being regulated,” 
while for others, it denotes “self-serving” or “self-interested” regulation). 
 53 See Keller, supra 6, at 6 (criticizing the voluntary hate speech code of conduct).  
 54 See Directives, Article 5, 88/6 Official J. of the European Union 9 (2017) (recognizing content 
removal as an effective measure against terrorism). 
55  See, e.g., UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH [2014) C-314/12 
(approving an Austrian Court site-blocking order). 
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Clearly, voluntary removal aims to serve commercial needs in its broadest 
meaning.
56
  Even voluntary content removal initiated by public discourse, such 
as those crafted by codes of conduct, still serves the platforms’ commercial 
needs, since the voluntary compliance with soft social norms fosters the online 
intermediary’s social legitimacy.  Yet, in cases of both voluntary and 
nonvoluntary monitoring activities that are initiated by public interest, a 
commercial and private entity is fulfilling societal needs.
57
  In that sense, the 
private entity is engaged in acts that normally would be conducted by public 
agencies.
58
  This mixture of functions conducted by private entities brings into 
the heart of the legal discourse the question of the legal nature of various 
online rulers. 
B. American and European Schemes for Infringing Content Monitoring 
In the U.S., a significant legal framework allowing the practice of voluntary 
content monitoring conducted by the digital intermediaries is set by the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA).
59
  Article 230 of the CDA provides the 
online intermediary with broad immunity from liability for user-generated 
content posted on their “premises,” without prejudice to any other law.  The 
underlying rationale of the “safe harbor” given to online intermediaries is both 
to encourage them to voluntarily, on a “Good Samaritan” basis, take an active 
role in removing offensive content,
60
 and also to avoid free speech problems 
of “collateral censorship.”
61
  Yet, this legal framework leaves online actors with 
vast discretion on the matter, and in fact gives no concrete guidelines.  
Therefore, voluntary content monitoring remains, to a large extent, a “black 
 
 56 See Klonick, supra note 16, at 1627 (noting economic reasons as the primary motive behind content 
removal). 
57  See Keller, supra 6, at 3-7 (describing various mechanisms by which governments stimulate private 
entities to moderate digital speech in order to promote social goals). 
58  Id. 
 59 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
 60 Id. § 230(b).  
61 See Balkin, supra note 43, at 2309 (“Collateral censorship occurs when the state holds one private 
party A liable for the speech of another private party B, and A has the power to block, censor, or 
otherwise control access to B’s speech.”); Felix T. Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of 
Intermediary Immunity, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 293, 347–49 (2011) (detailing differences between 
defamation and intellectual property claims with respect to immunity for intermediaries); Klonick, 
supra note 16, at 1602 (discussing the rationale behind granting immunity to online intermediaries 
for “user-generated content posted to their sites”). 
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  Moreover, since Article 230 to the CDA does not offer immunity 
based on intellectual property infringement, a special clause was enacted in 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA).
63
  Section 512 to the 
Copyright Act creates a safe harbor for some online intermediaries in case an 
infringing content passed traffic without their knowledge,
64
 and it establishes 
the notice-and-takedown mechanism for all Internet intermediaries that 
governs the monitoring of copyrighted content. 
An extensively described, discussed, and documented outcome of the 
notice-and-takedown regime, set by § 512 to the Copyright Act, is the 
allowance of mass and easy removal of allegedly infringing copyrighted 
content, ending up with a significant chilling effect to freedom of speech.
65 The 
various intermediaries, seeking the immunity, are incentivized to take down 
all requested content, despite the fact that the request could have been found 
unjustified had the case been decided by court.
66
  In other words, the 
intermediaries have no incentive to invest time and effort in a profound legal 
assessment of the requests, being an uninvolved third party in the conflict, and 
 
62 See Klonick, supra note 16, at 1630–47, 1663 (describing, in detail and based on interviews the 
“opaque” ways in which content is monitored voluntarily by the major online platforms).  
 63 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1988). 
 64 See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2012) (discussing what constitutes 
“knowledge” that would deprive immunity).  For the ramifications of this case and its extensive 
litigation until it was settled by the parties outside the court, see John T. Williams & Craig W. 
Mandell, Winning the Battle, but Losing the War: Why the Second Circuit’s Decision in Viacom 
Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc. is a Landmark Victory for Internet Service Providers, 41 AIPLA Q. J. 
235 (2013). 
 65 See Jerome H. Reichman, Graeme B. Dinwoodie, & Pamela Samuelson, A Reverse Notice and 
Takedown Regime to Enable Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted Works, 22 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 981 (2007) (calling for a reform that would allow the ban on the easy removal 
of content); Jennifer M. Urban, Joe Karaganis, & Brianna Schofield, Notice and Takedown: Online 
Service Provider and Rightsholder Accounts of Everyday Practice, 64 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 
371 (2017) (describing the practices of the notice-and-takedown mechanism); Daniel Etcovitch, 
DMCA § 512 Pain Points: Music and Technology Industry Perspectives in Juxtaposition, 30 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 547 (2017) (describing comments from both the music industry and the technology 
industry with respect to the DMCA and their call for reform); DAPHNE KELLER, INTERNET 
PLATFORMS: OBSERVATIONS ON SPEECH, DANGER, AND MONEY 18 (Hoover Institution, Aegis 
Series Paper No. 1807, 2018) (discussing laws surrounding liability for intermediaries); Niva Elkin-
Koren & Maayan Perel, Guarding the Guardians: Content Moderation by Online Intermediaries and 
the Rule of Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ONLINE INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY  (2020) (posing 
legal objections to content moderation and detailing “barriers to accountability in online content 
moderation by intermediaries”). 
 66 See Balkin, supra note 43, at 2314 (highlighting the duty of the intermediary to “promptly remove” 
content alleged to have infringed upon a party’s copyrights or risk liability). 
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the outcome is a massive and uncontrolled removal of content.
67
  This 
outcome is amplified by the operation of such mechanisms by automated 
systems, since the indifferent position of the online intermediary is translated 
into the design of the algorithm by setting the defaults.  Thus, in the current 
phase of online governance, the silencing mechanism is an algorithmic one.
68
 
Another popular legal path for content monitoring is by “blocking orders,” 
which are injunctions usually granted against ISPs, ordering them to block 
access to a certain website or specific source of content, or even directly 
ordering the removal of contents.
69
  However, blocking orders usually aim to 
monitor infringing content at the infrastructural layer.
70
  Blocking orders have 
been granted, occasionally and extensively, mainly in European countries, 
including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Ireland, and the 
United Kingdom.
71
  The European Court of Justice has approved this practice, 
which is in line with the European Directives referring to the matter.
72
  Outside 
 
 67 See, e.g., Jeffrey Cobia, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act Takedown Notice Procedure: 
Misuses, Abuses, and Shortcomings of the Process, 10 MINN. J. SCI. & TECH. 387, 390–93 (2009) 
(noting abuses of current takedown practices, and particularly highlighting the fact that content is 
often taken down that does not pose a copyright infringement). 
 68 See Niva Elkin-Koren & Maayan Perel, Separation of Functions for AI: Restraining Speech 
Regulation by Online Platforms, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK (Feb. 14, 2020), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3439261. 
 69 See, e.g., UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH [2014] C-314/12 
(approving an Austrian Court site-blocking order).  It should be noted that injunctions ordering to 
take down contents in the context of defamation law and hate speech, which are not at the focus of 
this article, are also at the heart of the discourse concerning content monitoring.  For example, in 
October 2019, the European Court of Justice (EUCJ) ruled in the case C-18/18 Eva Glawischnig-
Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., that the 2000/31/EC e-Commerce Directive does not preclude a 
Member State from ordering a hosting provider to remove or block content that has been declared 
unlawful.  The Court also held that the Directive does not preclude Member states from ordering 
such removal worldwide, and therefore left it to the Member States to determine the geographic 
scope of the injunction.  However, the Court left unconsidered the constitutional rights perspective.  
For a review and criticism of this decision, mainly due to the fear that such monitoring may take 
down legal speech, coined as “dolphins in the net,” see DAPHNE KELLER, DOLPHINS IN THE NET: 
INTERNET CONTENT FILTERS AND THE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S GLAWISCHNIG-PIESCZEK V. 
FACEBOOK IRELAND OPINION (2019) (identifying several problems and adverse consequences with 
the Glawischnig-Piesczek decision). 
70 See MARTIN HUSOVEC, INJUNCTIONS AGAINST INTERMEDIARIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: 
ACCOUNTABLE BUT NOT LIABLE? 19, 90 (2017) (discussing the broad definition of “intermediary” 
and the responsibility of third parties and intermediaries in responding to blocking orders). 
71 Id. at 184–210. 
 72 See, e.g., UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH [2014] C-314/12 
(approving an Austrian Court site-blocking order).  For a critical review of the English High Court 
and EUCJ approach to blocking orders, see Orit Fischman-Afori, Proportionality – A New Mega 
Standard in European Copyright Law, 45 INST. INNOVATION & COMPETITION 889, 890 (2014). 
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Europe, blocking orders are granted, for instance, in Australia
73
 and in Israel,
74
 
and were recently approved by the Canadian Supreme Court in the case of 
Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions Inc, upholding an order according to which 
Google should index all websites that sell goods violating a Canadian 
company’s trade secrets worldwide.
75
  Arguably, blocking orders may be 
granted on a global scale.
76
  Along with the § 512 safe harbors regime in the 
U.S., in a recent case decided by the Virginia District Court (ACS v. Sci-Hub),77 
the court surprisingly granted an order to block access to a website operated 
from outside the U.S. that provided access to unlicensed scientific materials.  
This decision, therefore, may signal a shift in the judiciary’s attitude to blocking 
orders in the U.S. as well.
78
 
The blocking orders scheme, like the notice-and-takedown, raises 
concerns with respect to its impact on freedom of speech in the digital sphere.  
Although the order is granted by Court, and therefore is clearly subject to 
judicial oversight, it nevertheless generates controversy as to its underlying 
policy and to its compatibility with applicable measures relating to 
constitutional remedies, such as efficiency, necessity, and most importantly—
proportionality.
79
  The Courts are struggling with the question of whether 
blocking orders are a proportionate remedy under the circumstances,
80
 and in 
 
 73 See Copyright Act 1968 § 115A (2019) (Austl.) (authorizing injunctions against intermediaries); see 
also David Lindsay, Website Blocking Injunctions to Prevent Copyright Infringements: 
Proportionality and Effectiveness, 40 U.N.S.W. L.J. 1507 (2017) (describing recent Australian court 
decisions granting site blocking orders). 
 74 Section 53A of the Israeli Copyright Act 2007 (Amendment No. 5 2019) authorizes injunctions 
against intermediaries. 
 75 Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions Inc, 2017 SCC 34, para. 1-5 (Can.). 
 76 See Case C-18/18, Eva Glawischnig-Piesczek v.  Facebook Ireland Limited, 2019 Curia (approving 
injunctions on a global scale).  For a critical view on “global injunctions,” see, for example, Michael 
Douglas, Extraterritorial Injunctions Affecting the Internet, 12 J. EQUITY 34 (2018) (considering the 
power of courts to issue extraterritorial injunctions). 
 77 Am. Chem. Soc’y v. Sci-Hub, Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-0726 (2017). 
 78 See Maayan Perel, Digital Remedies, 35 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2020) (discussing digital 
remedies). 
 79 See Fischman-Afori, supra note 72 (noting issues with blocking orders); see also, Althaf Marsoof, 
The Blocking Injunction – A Critical Review of Its Implementation in the United Kingdom Within 
the Legal Framework of the European Union (2015) (evaluating the blocking injunction in the United 
Kingdom); Matthias Leistner, Intermediary Liability in a Global World, in PLURALISM OR 
UNIVERSALISM IN INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW 471 (2019). 
 80 See, e.g., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. British Telecomms. PLC, [2011] R.P.C. 28 (noting 
the various factors that should be considered in order to conclude that a blocking order, granted in 
accordance with specific authorization in the law, meets the proportionality requirement); Golden 
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at least one case the EUCJ overruled a national blocking order for being 
disproportionate.
81
  Yet, the dominant trend widely adopts this scheme.
82
     
The imposition of active obligations on online intermediaries to monitor 
content stood at the heart of the controversy relating to the European Union 
Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, which was adopted in 
spring 2019 (Copyright Single Market Directive).
83
  The underlying policy of 
the Copyright Single Market Directive is to strengthen the position of 
copyright owners vis-a-vis the various online platforms, considering what is 
coined as the “value gap”—the gap between the economic value generated by 
online platforms, and its fair share with content creators and copyright 
owners.
84
  This development reflects the first legal move for applying 
mandatory active content monitoring obligations on online rulers.  The strong 
opposition to the Copyright Digital Single Market Directive was based on fear 
it would hinder Digital Human Rights, yet despite a large public outcry
85
 and 
resistance of several member states, it was finally approved.
86
  Article 17 to the 
 
Eye (Int’l) Ltd. v. Telefonica UK Ltd., [2012] EWHC 723 (UK) (weighing the rights of copyright 
owners and consumers); EMI Records Ltd. v. British Sky Broad. Ltd. [2013] EWHC 379 (UK) 
(granting a blocking order); Cartier Int’l v. British Sky Broad., [2014] EWHC 3794 (UK); Football 
Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. British Telecomms. [2017] EWHC 480 (UK) (considering whether a 
blocking order is “appropriate and proportionate”). 
 81 See SABAM Cases, supra note 9 (discussing systems to filter information to prevent copyright 
infringement). 
82 See Fischman-Afori, supra note 72 (discussing a “proportionality test as a remedy-based measure in 
the copyright” infringement context and the movement away from a bright-line decision of whether 
to generally grant or reject a blocking injunction); Marsoof, supra note 79 (noting issues with blocking 
injunctions). 
 83 Directive (EU) 2019/790, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on 
copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 
2001/29/EC, 2019 O.J. (L 130) [hereinafter Copyright Digital Single Market Directive]. 
 84 See KULK, supra note 3, at 61–62 (discussing a proposed directive that would help to “strengthen the 
position of copyright owners”). 
 85 See, e.g., EU copyright bill: Protests across Europe highlight rifts over plans, DEUTSCHE WELLE 
(Mar. 23, 2019), https://www.dw.com/en/eu-copyright-bill-protests-across-europe-highlight-rifts-over-
reform-plans/a-48037133 (noting how “[c]ritics of EU internet copyright reforms have rallied across 
Europe ahead of a crucial vote in the European Parliament”); Cory Doctorow, The Worst Possible 
Version of the EU Copyright Directive has Sparked a German Uprising, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. 
(Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/02/worst-possible-version-eu-copyright-directive-
has-sparked-german-uprising (noting how “with just two days of organizing, hundreds of Europeans 
marched on the streets of Cologne against Article 13”). 
 86 The final approval in spring 2019 was not unanimous: Three member states abstained and six voted 
against.  In a joint statement, the opposing member states explained that the Directive may encroach 
on EU citizens’ rights, and therefore, they have voted against its adoption.  See KULK, supra note 3, 
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Copyright Single Market Directive contains a line of obligations on “online 
content sharing service provider,” including an obligation to obtain an 
authorization from rightsholders with respect to any copyrighted work that is 
intended to be communicated by their services;
87
 in the absence of such 
authorization the intermediary should demonstrate that best efforts were made 
to prevent the availability of specific works identified by rightsholders.
88
  Upon 
notification by rightsholders, the intermediary should act expeditiously to 
remove these works,
89
 and the intermediary should “provide rightsholders, at 
their request, with adequate information on the functioning of their practices 
with regard to the cooperation referred to" concerning removal of content.”
90
 
Moreover, Article 17 (9) obliges the intermediaries to establish an effective 
and expeditious complaint and redress mechanism, in the service of users 
disputing over the removal of content, e.g. wishing to benefit from exceptions 
or limitations to copyright.  The complaints should be "processed without 
undue delay" and decisions to remove content following such complaints will 
be "subject to human review".” This Article further stresses that “Member 
States shall also ensure that out-of-court redress mechanisms are available for 
the settlement of disputes[,]" that such mechanism shall enable disputes "to be 
settled impartially[,]" and that users shall not be deprived of the legal protection 




The first EU measure to address an Internet intermediary’s liability was 
the e-Commerce Directive adopted in 2000,
92
 which established immunity for 
the intermediaries on various legal grounds—albeit with no mandatory notice-
and-takedown scheme, which could nevertheless be adopted voluntarily.
93
  
Article 17 to the Copyright Single Market Directive moves to a mandatory 
adoption of a nuanced notice-and-takedown scheme, but these schemes were 
 
at 63 (explaining that these member states felt that the text of the approved directive would stifle 
innovation). 
 87 Copyright Digital Single Market Directive, supra note 83, at 119. 
 88 Id. at 120. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 120–21. 
 92 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 8, 2000 on certain 
legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market 
(Directive on electronic commerce), 2000 O.J. (L 178) [hereinafter EU e-Commerce Directive].  
 93 Following the EU e-Commerce Directive, Finland is the only EU member state that has adopted a 
statutory notice-and-takedown mechanism.  KULK, supra note 3, at 117. 
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in fact already adopted in a self-regulatory manner.
94
 Therefore, it is very likely 
that the same extensively described, discussed, and documented chilling effect 
of the American notice-and-takedown scheme
95
 already takes place in Europe 
as well.  Yet, Article 17 contains additional, far-reaching active obligations for 
content monitoring, such as the obligation to make "best efforts", in fulfilling 
the duty to have rightsholders’ authorization for the use of their content, and 
also to make best efforts in accordance with "high industry standards of 
professional diligence" to ensure the unavailability of content the rightholder 
indicated.
96
  These obligations are in fact referring to  implementation of 
content recognition technologies, similar to the “content ID” systems applied 
voluntarily by YouTube.
97
  The difference, however, is that in contrast to the 
notice-and-takedown scheme in which the online ruler is responsive to a 
conflict initiated by a third party, Article 17 shifts the liability to the online 
ruler to proactively initiate the process of obtaining authorization and thereby 
of content filtering and removal through content recognition technologies.  
Moreover, Article 17 includes a “staydown” active obligation, aimed at making 
sure that there is no reuploading of removed content.
98
  Content ID systems 
likewise raised the concern of generating a chilling effect on digital speech, 
since, it may, for example, block the use of copyrighted content that could 
have been qualified as fair use and therefore non-infringing.
99
  In other words, 
 
 94 See KULK, supra note 3, at 116–120 (discussing the notice-and-takedown scheme). 
 95 See supra note 65. 
96  Copyright Digital Single Market Directive, supra note 83, at 120.  See also Article 17(4)(b)–(c). 
97  KULK, supra note 3, at 133 (noting the possibility of making “effective content recognition 
technologies” mandatory). For the operation of the YouTube content ID system, see YouTube 
Creators, YouTube Content ID, YOUTUBE (Sept. 28, 2010), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9g2U12SsRns. 
 98 See Copyright Digital Single Market Directive, supra note 83, at 120 (Article 17 (4) (c)) stipulates that 
the service providers should make "best efforts to prevent their future uploads in accordance with 
point (b)").  See also Felipe Romero-Moreno, Notice and Staydown and Social Media: Amending 
Article 13 of the Proposed Directive on Copyright, 33 INT’L REV.  L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 187, 
203–04 (2019) (discussing “‘notice and staydown’ duties, under which a regular takedown notification 
from a rightholder for a specific unlawful file would trigger a duty for the service provider to 
proactively identify and eliminate all instances of the allegedly infringing content and prevent future 
uploads”).  
 99 See, e.g., Taylor B. Bartholomew, Note, The Death of Fair Use in Cyberspace: YouTube and the 
Problem with Content ID, 13 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 66, 68 (2015) (emphasis omitted) (“[The 
Content ID system] has proven to be problematic in its application on YouTube by undermining the 
doctrine of fair use through indiscriminate flagging of legitimate uses of original content.  Put simply, 
Content ID is blatantly hostile to users’ interests because it shifts the neutral presumption of fair use 
against them.”); Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright 
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an automated system may produce “false positives” outcomes, which are 
inconsistent with freedom of speech as the default principle.
100
  Moreover, the 
major obstacle with content recognition technologies is that they are run by 
private entities, which are not compelled to reveal the design of their 
algorithm; therefore these systems are operated with no safeguards in place 
for the protection of users and the public at large.
101
  As one commentator 
concluded, private entities such as Google and YouTube “have adopted a role 
for [themselves] that is similar to a collective management organization, but 
without there being any checks on its practices.”
102
  Users become dependent 
on the good intentions of online rulers to provide adequate protection to their 
rights and freedoms. 
C. A Broader Perspective on Content Monitoring and “Digital Human 
Rights” 
Online rulers are private corporations, motivated by profit.  Yet, as 
presented above, some of their activities, such as content monitoring, raise 
profound questions concerning the protection of Digital Human Rights.  Since 
content monitoring is governed by these private entities’ own voluntary 
policies or their own technology, even if they were obliged to implement such 
measures, these measures would lack basic elements embedded in public law 
guarantees of human rights, such as accountability, transparency, reasoning, 
and equality.
103
  The fear is that these intermediaries would moderate digital 
 
Enforcement, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 473 (2016); Martin Senftleben, Christina Angelopoulos, 
Giancarlo Frosio, Valentina Moscon, Miquel Peguera, & Ole Andreas Rognstad, The 
Recommendation on Measures to Safeguard Fundamental Rights and the Open Internet in the 
Framework of the EU Copyright Reform, 40 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 149, 187 (2018) (referring 
to European style exceptions that could be undermined by such monitoring systems). 
 100 See Toni Lester & Dessislava Pachamanova, The Dilemma of False Positives: Making Content ID 
Algorithms More Conducive to Fostering Innovative Fair Use in Music Creation, 24 UCLA ENT. L. 
REV. 51, 53 (2017) (claiming that “these programs can produce ‘false positives,’ where legally 
allowable music associated with a reference file is inappropriately blocked”). 
101  See, e.g., Senftleben et al., supra note 99, at 4 (pointing that "the decision over the scope and reach 
of filtering measures must not be left to agreements between industry representatives that are likely 
to focus on cost and efficiency considerations instead of seeking to avoid unnecessary content 
censorship.") 
 102 See KULK, supra note 3, at 284. 
 103 These elements are regarded as the underlying principles of public and administrative law.  See 
STEPHEN BREYER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & REGULATORY POLICY (3d ed. 1992); Cary 
Coglianese, Administrative Law: The U.S. and Beyond, in  INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
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speech too heavily, or on a capricious or discriminatory basis, and they would 
thereby risk freedom of speech and all other nuanced Digital Human Rights.
104
  
As stressed above, while this fear was relevant in the pre-digital era with respect 
to traditional media and press as well,
105
 the global reach and gigantic size of 
some online rulers not only amplifies the problem but in fact changes the 
democratic balance. 
Jack Balkin described this new triangular social structure, in which a third 
angle is found in addition to public authorities and individuals—online 
intermediaries.  Nowadays, the threat to human rights, and particularly to 
freedom of speech, is created not only by governmental authorities but to an 
even greater extent by private entities governing the online traffic of content.
106
  
A growing mass of scholarly works is turning the spotlight onto this new global 
challenge, in which Digital Human Rights are mainly threatened by private 
sector entities whose own policies are not governed by basic public law 
guarantees.
107
  For example, the dominancy of the online platforms in the 
democratic free speech environment was described as the “new governors,” 
namely the controllers of the free flow of expressions;
108
 as a private law activity 
that stands at the “shadows” of the state;
109
 or as “nonstate regulators” of the 
public sphere.
110
  Moreover, since such control is usually carried out by 
 
SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES, (James D. Wright, ed., 2d ed. 2015) (discussing the “salient 
political theory and legal issues fundamental to the U.S. administrative state but with relevance to the 
design and application of administrative law in any jurisdiction”); Administrative Procedure Act, 5 
U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1946); see also Klonick, supra note 16, at 1609, 1665–69 ( “There is very little 
transparency from these private platforms, making it hard to accurately assess the extent to which we 
should be concerned about speech regulation, censorship, and collateral censorship.”); Bloch-
Wehba, supra note 5, at 61 (noting how some have argued that “speech governance by online 
platforms is inappropriate because the companies are not chosen through a democratic process”). 
 104 See Kyle Langvardt, A New Deal for the Online Public Sphere, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 341, 349 
(2018) (discussing certain speech-related risks that these intermediaries raise). 
 105 See supra notes 22–25 and accompanying text. 
 106 See Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2011, 2011 (2018) (arguing that 
social media companies govern digital speech). 
 107 For one of the earliest scholarly writings on the matter, see Paul Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the 
State Action Debate: The Cultural Value of Applying Constitutional Norms to “Private” Regulation, 
71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1263, 1265–66 (2000) (discussing how web sites set their own terms and 
conditions which become the “law” of their pages). 
 108 See Klonick, supra note 16, at 1663 (describing private, online platforms as the new regulators free 
speech). 
 109 See Bloch-Wehba, supra note 5, at 33–34 (establishing their own legal structures that online 
platforms believed would work better than the physical world). 
 110 See Langvardt, supra note 104, at 342 (describing the regulations put in place by internet companies 
to shape speech on their platforms). 
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automated algorithms, these “new governors” and “nonstate regulators” may 
turn out to be machines operated via artificial intelligence, generating new legal 
challenges for both private and public laws.
111
  Yet, both the research and legal 
structuring of this troubling phenomenon are still in their first steps. 
The U.N. Human Rights Commission, as described above, gave special 
attention to freedom of expression in the digital environment, and particularly 
to its safeguards on social media platforms.  The first Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the matter, issued in 2011, reflected both a comprehensive 
acknowledgment of the important role online platforms served in 
contemporary social structure,
112
 and of the necessity to set rules and legal 
boundaries to content monitoring carried out by these bodies.  The Report 
opened by articulating the basic principle according to which: 
Censorship measures should never be delegated to private entities, and that 
intermediaries should not be held liable for refusing to take action that 
infringes individuals’ human rights.  Any requests submitted to intermediaries 
to prevent access to certain content, or to disclose private information for 
strictly limited purposes such as administration of criminal justice, should be 
done through an order issued by a court or a competent body which is 
independent of any political, commercial or other unwarranted influences.
113
 
In other words, the Report stated that nonvoluntary specific content 
blocking should be carried out by a specific court order.  Moreover, it stated 
that online platforms should serve as gatekeepers in protecting human rights.114  
The Report further elaborated some concrete obligations stemming from the 
duty of online platforms to safeguard human rights in the context of content 
monitoring: Content monitoring should be transparent to both the relevant 
individuals and to the public; it should apply proportionate measures such as 
providing a forewarning if possible, and minimize the restriction strictly to the 
 
 111 See Sofia Grafanaki, Platforms, the First Amendment and Online Speech: Regulating the Filters, 39 
PACE L. REV. 111, 122–23 (2018) (discussing the conundrum in trying to regulate fake news); 
Langvardt, supra note 104, at 349–50 (referring to platforms’ ability to silo users or curate their 
information); Keller, supra note 6 (describing the fear that general content monitoring, especially 
when conducted by algorithms, would silence legal speech). 
 112 See Report of the Special Rapporteur 2011, supra note 34(stating the importance of a generally free 
and open internet). 
 113 Id. at 75. 
 114 This last principle was further stated upfront: “[W]hile States are the primary duty-bearers of human 
rights, the Special Rapporteur underscores that corporations also have a responsibility to respect 
human rights, which means that they should act with due diligence to avoid infringing the rights of 
individuals.” The Report of the Special Rapporteur 2011, supra note 38, at 76. 
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necessary content involved (i.e. the restriction should be proportionate).
115
  
These statements marked the first step of an institutional-public discourse 
regarding the need to tilt the ‘human rights ship’ towards the private sector’s 
duties and obligations.  And, keeping with the naval metaphor, the Report of 
the Special Rapporteur of the U.N. Human Rights Commission functions as 
a signal given by the central lighthouse on shore. 
The second Report of the Special Rapporteur, issued on the matter in 
2018, was based on a global survey seeking to sketch an actual and empirical 
picture with respect to voluntary and nonvoluntary content monitoring 
practices.
116
  The overall finding was that, on a global scale, freedom of speech 
is not protected adequately by the private sector.  While many companies have 
adopted some measure of compliance with standards aimed at preventing state 
censorship (i.e. nonvoluntary content monitoring), the rest of voluntary 
content monitoring has not met appropriate standards of transparency and 
nondiscrimination.
117
  Moreover, another troubling finding in this survey was 
that content monitoring is often carried out by automated methods, namely 
algorithmic decision-making processes, which are unaccountable to any results 
affecting individuals’ human rights.
118
  It should be mentioned that the official 
U.S. response to this survey was somewhat laconic: It emphasized the limited 
volume of nonvoluntary content monitoring obligations in the U.S.,
119
 while 
with respect to voluntary content monitoring it simply mentioned that “internet 
companies, of their own volition, may and do remove online content that 
violates their terms of service.”
120
  The final Report, therefore, concluded that 
 
 115 Id. at 76–77. 
116 See Special Rapporteur on the Protection and Promotion of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression, Overview of submission received in preparation of the Report of the Special Rapporteur, 
2–3 (A/HRC/38/35), A/HRC/38/35/Add.1. (June 6, 2018) (describing the compilation of 
submissions for the report). 
 117 The overview of submissions received in preparation of the Report of the Special Rapporteur also 
referred to a research conducted by The Danish Institute for Human Rights, that “shows that 
company commitments to human rights only extend to ‘protecting against external threats from 
governments.’”  Danish Institute for Human Rights, Rikke Jørgensen, Framing Human Rights: 
Exploring Storytelling Within Internet Companies at 4; see id. at 42. 
 118 See id. at 40–49. 
 119 See Letter from Jason B. Mack, U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to the U.N. Human Rights 
Council, to David Kaye, Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression U.S. Response to Request for Submissions on Social Media, 
Search, and Freedom of Expression (April 10, 2018), (”As a general matter, U.S. law does not impose 
an obligation on internet companies to remove, restrict, or otherwise regulate online content that is 
protected under the First Amendment.”) 
 120 Id. 
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“[d]espite taking steps to illuminate their rules and government interactions, 
the companies remain enigmatic regulators, establishing a kind of ‘platform 
law’ in which clarity, consistency, accountability and remedy are elusive.”
121
  
The Report further elaborates some concrete recommendations as to the 
appropriate way to face these challenges.  A special emphasis was given to the 
need to make the private sector’s companies subject to human rights 
obligations, and to turn civil compliance to basic human rights into the default 
standard.
122
  More specifically, according to the Report, “Companies should 
incorporate directly into their terms of service and ‘community standards’ 
relevant principles of human rights law that ensure content-related actions will 
be guided by the same standards of legality, necessity and legitimacy that bind 
State regulation of expression.”
123
 
Finally, the Special Rapporteur’s clear voice on the matter was heard once 
again with respect to then proposed provision of the Copyright Digital Single 
Market Directive, eventually adopted in Article 17 described above, which 
imposes far-reaching active obligations on major online rulers in order to 
strengthen rightsholders’ economic interests.  In an open letter, the Special 
Rapporteur expressed his concerns that this (then-proposed) provision was 
incompatible with both Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (securing freedom of speech) and Article 15 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (securing 
the right to participate in cultural life).
124
  He further expressed fear that this 
obligation could lead to “pressure on content sharing providers to err on the 
side of caution,” pointing at the known chilling effect that stems from the risk-
averse behavior of a uninvolved third party.
125
  The Special Rapporteur also 
referred to the lack of requirement of prior judicial review in the then-
proposed provisions, currently adopted in Article 17, and subsequently stated 
that “intermediaries must not be required to restrict content unless an order 
has been issued by an independent and impartial judicial authority that has 
determined that the material at issue is unlawful,” in order to prevent 
censorship in the digital sphere.
126
  As described above, the mechanism finally 
 
 121 Report of the Special Rapporteur 2018, supra note 37, at ¶ 1. 
 122 See id. at 44–48, 70–72 (setting out principles for responsible content monitoring). 
 123 Id. at 45. 
 124 David Kaye, Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc. OL OTH 41/2018, 3–8 (June 13, 2018).  
125  Id. 
126  Id. 
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adopted in Article 17 does not follow this recommended path and it obliges 
online service providers to remove content upon rightsholders' request, with 
no prior judicial order.    
D. The Public/Private Divide Barrier 
The recommendation in the second Report of the Special Rapporteur 
raises the general issue of introducing public law principles into the private 
sector and the question of how such a legal move should be implemented de-
facto.  A few scholars have already stressed the need to accommodate online 
platforms’ activities to human rights standards.
127
  In line with this scholarly 
movement, Jack Balkin proposed that private law fiduciary duties should be 
applied to some Internet platforms.
128
  However, the legal way for imposing 
such standards has not yet been profoundly explored.  Voluntary acceptance 
of minimal public law standards, on a “Good Samaritan” basis, seems to be 
inadequate, considering the growing importance online rulers play in the 
societal democratic structure.
129
  Imposition of public law duties may be carried 
out, therefore, either by legislation or by judicial doctrine. 
An example of a legislative path was proposed by a few scholars, suggesting 
that any content monitoring and removal would be subject to either 
administrative, special advisory council, or judicial prior review and approval, 
to ensure that it complies with free speech principles.
130
  The Special 
 
 127 See, e.g., Evelyn Mary Aswad, The Future of Freedom of Expression Online, 17 DUKE L. & TECH. 
REV. 26, 38–40 (2019) (proposing which terms should be inserted into the online platforms contracts 
in order to promote guarantees for freedom of speech that are in line with the international law 
standards); see also Noa Mor, No Longer Private: On Human Rights and the Public Facet of Social 
Network Sites, 47 HOFSTRA L. REV. 651, 654 (2018) (proposing to impose some public law 
principles upon private bodies operating social network sites such as Facebook, due to the impact on 
users’ basic human rights); Langvardt, supra note 104, at 380–81 (proposing a new approach to the 
nonstate regulators, i.e. online platforms, according to which they would be perceived as state 
agencies). 
 128 See Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1183, 1205 (2016) (arguing that the government should regulate certain kinds of private information). 
 129 For a similar view, see Langvardt, supra note 104, at 348 (stating that social platforms are destroying 
users’ abilities to hear conflicting views); Bloch-Wehba, supra note 5, at 63 (discussing the 
cooperation between public and private agencies in enforcing speech regulations).  For the view that 
self-regulation is still the recommended way to tackle content monitoring, see Klonick, supra note 
14, at 1666. 
 130 See Langvardt, supra note 104, at 355 (discussing the ways in which online content could be 
moderated); Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content Moderation, 106 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
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Rapporteur, in his open letter concerning the Copyright Single Market 
Directive described above, expressed a similar view.
131
  Concerns were raised 
as to whether such proposals are workable, due to the immense burden on 
the administrative agencies.
132
  Prior administrative or even judicial approval 
for any act is unrealistic.  Moreover, any proposed legislation should be highly 
attentive to potential counter chilling effects on the freedom of speech and 




An example of a judicial doctrine, proposed as a potential vehicle for 
imposing public law obligations on online platforms, is perceiving the 
platforms as “newspaper editors” or “media broadcasters” who are thus willing 
collaborators with government censorship, acting as “arms of the state.”
134
  Yet, 
this doctrine is rather limited, and it does not generate an overall legal 
framework with the guarantees needed for the adoption of human rights 
standards, such as accountability, transparency, reasoning, and equality in all 
cases of content monitoring.
135
  This mechanism, at best, may be appropriate 
for extreme cases of state censorship, concerning issues such as national 
security or child pornography, and is not apt for every day content monitoring, 
 
1353, 1357, 1376 (2018) (proposing that the policy for content monitoring would be approved by 
court or an administrative body in order for the platform to enjoy a safe-harbor clause that would be 
legislated on a Federal level).  For a similar proposal, in the context of the “Right to be Forgotten,” 
see Edward Lee, Recognizing Rights in Real Time: The Role of Google in the EU Right to Be 
Forgotten, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1017, 1035 (2016).  Hannah Bloch-Wehba has proposed that 
non-governmental regulatory bodies, such as ICANN, which are in fact “meta-regulators,” should 
bridge the private/public gap and create standards that all can adhere to, supra note 5, at 71. 
 131 See Kaye, supra note 124, at 1, 9 (discussing the then European Commission’s proposed provision, 
currently adopted in Article 17 to the Copyright Digital Single Market Directive, which requires 
“online content sharing service providers” to monitor copyright-protected content).  
 132 See Bloch-Wehba, supra note 5, at 64–65 (discussing the concern in light of increasingly privatized 
government roles). 
 133 These fears have led to the legislation of the vast immunity found in § 230 of the CDA. See Danielle 
Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans § 230 
Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 404 (2017) (discussing the overbroad interpretation of the 
legislation).  However, it was further argued that some adjustments to § 230 should be crafted in 
order to prevent illegal activities.  See id. at 404  (”[W]ith modest adjustments to § 230, either through 
judicial interpretation or legislation, we can have a robust culture of free speech online without 
shielding from liability platforms designed to host illegality or that deliberately host illegal content.”); 
Klonick, supra note 16, at 1666 (arguing any proposed legislation must align with the existing self-
regulatory structure in order to be effective). 
 134 See Klonick, supra note 14, at 1609; Bloch-Wehba, supra note 5, at 61. 
 135 Bloch-Wehba, supra note 5, at 61. 
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concerning issues such as copyright infringement.
136
  Moreover, the massive 
amount of content flow and the need for fast responsiveness on digital 
platforms make these legal tools ineffective and therefore obsolete.
137
 
These examples feed into the feeling of legal helplessness in recent 
scholarly writing and public discourse, created by the gap between the 
acknowledgement of the urgent need to introduce basic human rights 
standards to the operation of online platforms and the seeming lack of ability 
to initiate such legal move.
138
  Nevertheless, in the following parts we will 
examine a comprehensive legal doctrine that may serve as a vehicle or 
underlying force for the needed legal move of imposing human rights 
standards on private online intermediaries. 
III. THE PERCOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS INTO THE 
PRIVATE SPHERE 
A. General Background 
The scholarship pertaining to the currently described threat to free speech 
in the digital environment hits a major stumbling block: Although it 
acknowledges the necessity to apply human rights standards to online actors, 
 
 136 An indicative example of a refusal of online platforms to remove content, despite government 
requests, is described by Kate Klonick, based on interviews with officials in the online platforms’ 
companies.  These interviews reveal that when it comes to high profile issues, such as “Wikileaks,” 
then special attention is given to the balance of the various interests at stake.  See Klonick, supra note 
16, at 1622–25 (discussing the recognition such companies get for their pushback to government).  
However, it is unreasonable to expect that day-to-day requests for content removal would be treated 
similarly, though should be subject to a structured fair process as well. 
 137 See Langvardt, supra note 104, at 354 (“Facebook alone today employs several thousand content 
moderators who reportedly evaluate about one piece of content every ten seconds.”). 
 138 See, e.g., Bloch-Wehba, supra note 5, at 80 (concluding that “platforms must take on these tasks 
themselves rather than waiting for government to act, because to wait is to allow the structures of 
private ordering to be coopted by state censors.”); Klonick, supra note 16, at 1602 (explaining that 
“scholars have moved between optimistic and pessimistic views of platforms and have long debated 
how — or whether — to constrain them”); Langvardt, supra note 104, at 349 (concluding that though 
there is an extensive literature around the risk to freedom of speech by the platforms, and various 
proposals to regulate them, there are nevertheless “few policy proposals that contain any detail about 
how to implement this kind of regulation, and thus far no one in any government has shown any 
interest in them”); see also Thomas E. Kadri & Kate Klonick, Facebook v. Sullivan: Public Figures 
and Newsworthiness in Online Speech, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 37, 38 (2019) (describing the current 
voluntary solution Facebook adopts, by creating an “Oversight Board that will hopefully provide due 
process to users on the platform’s speech decisions and transparency about how content-moderation 
policy is made . . . .”). 
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the imposition of such principles becomes complicated since these actors are 
private entities.
139
  This is the result of a dichotomic perception, according to 
which either a certain body is a state actor governed by public law, or else it is 
a private entity completely free from public law principles.  The controversial 
American state action doctrine, adhering to this dichotomic perception, will 
be further described in following Part III.B. 
Modern law perceptions encompass a much more complex social 
structure, perceiving the public/private law divide as a continuous spectrum of 
contingencies, according to the extent of applicable public law principles.  
While with respect to state actors, such as the government and state 
administration bodies, public law principles should be applied in full, there 
are further along the curve in-between situations of non-state actors that 
nevertheless would be subject to some public law principles.  The extent of 
applicability of public law principles may vary according to the strength of the 
potential conflict with human rights.  The understanding that the application 
of public law principles is not binary but rather a dynamic range of situations, 
with varied impositions of human rights standards, is the outcome of a gradual 
process in which public law principles have percolated into the private law 
sphere.  These new, dynamic perceptions will be further described in Part 
IIIV.C. 
A prominent doctrine primarily adopted in European countries, dubbed 
“hybrid bodies,” applies a dynamic perception of the public/private divide.  
This doctrine will be explored in Part III.D. Then, finally, in Chapter IV, 
loose ends will be tied up, and the possible application of the hybrid bodies 
doctrine to online rulers will be explored.         
B. The U.S. State Action Doctrine 
The “state action” doctrine refers to a constitutional principle developed 
by the U.S. Supreme Court, according to which the U.S. Constitution and its 
individual proclaimed rights apply only to state action and not to private 
action.
140
  State action refers to all government actions, including those carried 
 
 139 See Klonick, supra note 16, at 1659 (arguing it is unlikely online platforms could be considered state 
actors). 
 140 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 18 (1883) (holding that Congress lacked the power to enact 
legislation regulating private racial discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment); Developments 
in the Law: State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1248, 1250 (2010) 
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out by the executive, legislature, and judiciary at both state and federal levels.  
In contrast, private action refers to all nongovernmental actions.
141
  Therefore, 
for instance, private discrimination is not actionable under the 14th 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which proclaims the state’s 
nondiscriminatory principle, in the absence of federal and state statutory law 
to the contrary.
142
  The state action doctrine applies to the constitutional 
safeguard of free speech as well.
143
 
The state action doctrine raises many questions, some controversial, as to 
its limits, boundaries, and justification.
144
  One of the doctrine’s greatest 
conundrums is drawing a clear line between a state actor and a non-state 
actor.
145
  Many court decisions found creative ways to impute state action in 
 
(“In the Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court laid down the bright-line rule of state action . . . .”); 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 504 (1985) (“State action 
doctrines remain the dividing line between the public sector, which is controlled by the Constitution, 
and the private sector, which is not.”). 
 141 See Developments in the Law: State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra note 140, at 
1256–61 (describing the early developments of this conceptual divide). 
 142 The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution proclaims: “No state shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 
407 U.S. 163, 178–179 (1972) (holding that a private restaurant or bar may discriminate its cliental); 
Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357–358 (1974) (holding that mere approval by a state 
utility commission of a business practice does not constitute state action). 
 143 See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520–21 (1976) (rejecting a free speech claim against a private 
mall).  For a review of similar cases, see Jennifer Niles Coffin, The United Mall of America: Free 
Speech, State Constitutions, and the Growing Fortress of Private Property, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
615, 622–30 (2000) (discussing a line of cases that hold mall owners cannot suppress free speech on 
their premises); Developments in the Law: State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, supra 
note 140, at 1311–12. 
 144 See, Chemerinsky, supra note 140, at 506 (advocating for the abolition of the state action doctrine); 
Michael J. Phillips, The Inevitable Incoherence of Modern State Action Doctrine, 28 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 683, 683 (1984) (describing the incoherent application of the doctrine); Gary Peller & Mark 
Tushnet, State Action and a New Birth of Freedom, 92 GEO. L. J. 779, 789  (2004) (calling for the 
doctrine’s abolishment); Developments in the Law: State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 
supra note 140, at 1313 (“[T]he continuing debate is further evidence that in an era in which public 
use and private ownership collide increasingly often, a court’s theory of state action on private 
property can have serious implications.”). 
 145 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13, 22–23 (1948) (holding that if a private individual or entity 
merely enters into a discriminatory contract it is not state action, but judicial enforcement of such a 
contractual right would be qualified as a state action). 
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cases involving racism operated by private actors,
146
 yet these decisions 
amplified the stance that the concept of state action is both easily manipulated 
and inherently incoherent.
147
  Whether limited or not, the state action doctrine 
reflects the basic American legal core principle that constitutional rights are to 
protect individuals from the power of the state and not to regulate relations 
between individuals, which is left to private law.  Moreover, the state action 
doctrine adheres to the underlying U.S. constitutional rationale that preserves 
an area of individual freedom, out of reach of the state.
148
 
Within attempts to avoid the ill-consequences of the state action doctrine, 
certain decisions crafted exemptions that stretched the concept of state actor.  
For instance, in the seminal case of Marsh v. Alabama, the Supreme Court 
indicated that discriminatory action conducted by a private actor may be 
imputed as state action if it involved an exercise of a “public function.”
149
  In 
emulating a private property to a public sphere area, the Supreme Court held 
that “the more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by 
the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the 
statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it.”
150
  This ruling was 
further expanded to shopping malls, being private properties serving public 
utility.
151
  Yet, this route was eventually overruled by subsequent decisions.
152
  
Another known attempt to elaborate an exemption to the state action doctrine 
was in the landmark case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, in which the 
Supreme Court ruled that a state court decision enforcing common law rules 
regarding defamation (discussing a state official’s claims against a privately 
 
 146 See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth. 365 U.S. 715, 726 (1961) (holding that a private restaurant’s 
policy of racial discrimination qualified as state action because the restaurant leased space from a 
government agency). 
 147 See Phillips, supra note 144, at 697 (discussing how Burton advanced the Court’s “doctrinal 
diffusion”).  
 148 Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936–37 (1982).  See also Berman, supra note 107, at 
1268 (arguing that although the critique concerning the incoherence of the public/private divide is 
correct, nevertheless “most Americans are likely to resist, on an intuitive level, scholarly attempts to 
erode the distinction between public and private.  Most of us like to believe that there are spheres of 
privacy in which we exist, untouched by the state”). 
 149 See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946) (holding that a privately-owned mining town was 
nevertheless perceived as a “quasi-municipality” for anti-discrimination purposes). 
 150 Id. 
 151 See Amalgamated Food Emps. Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 325 (1968) (holding 
the mall was the functional equivalent of a “business block” and should be treated as such for First 
Amendment purposes). 
 152 See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976) (stating that “the rationale of Logan Valley did not 
survive the Court’s decisions in [Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner]”).  
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owned newspaper) had an impact upon free speech and press rights and 
therefore created a state action that had triggered the application of 
constitutional rules of free speech.
153  Nevertheless, despite these and other 
exemptions, most court decisions tend to tighten the standard against a finding 
of “state action.”  The common assertion is that it is not enough that a private 
party has acted under some nexus to the state, such as acting under state 
regulation or license, and it is necessary to establish that the actions were 
attributable to the state.
154
  In line of this rigid trend, the Supreme Court held 
in June 2019 in the case of Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck 
that, once again, a private company running a television network is not a “state 
actor,” even if it operates under a contract with the City of New York, and 
therefore it is not bound to freedom of speech.
155
 
The current Supreme Court’s approach has been described as a return to 
the early formalistic approach.
156
  Some scholars perceive this trend as 
foreclosing any potential application of U.S. constitutional rights in the private 
sector.
157
  And more specifically, the Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. 
Halleck ruling could be perceived as a clear sign of the Supreme Court’s 
refusal to impose public law standards, headed by freedom of speech, on 
online social media private services,
158
 despite the acknowledgment of social 
media networks as the digital public market square in the Packingham v. North 
Carolina case.159 
Considering the current formalistic approach of the U.S. Supreme Court 
to the state action doctrine, which seems to foreclose the path for a direct 
application of freedom of speech on private entities, various proposals have 
been made seeking to solve the problem of control over free speech by major 
 
 153 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964). 
 154 Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978). 
 155 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1931 (2019) (reaching the holding by a 5-4 decision).  But see id. at 1934 (Sotomayor, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that the private company stepped into the City’s shoes and thus should have 
been qualified as a “state actor,” who is then subject to the First Amendment).  
 156 For a review of the evolvement of the state action doctrine until its current restrictive phase, see 
Jonathan Peters, The “Sovereigns of Cyberspace” and State Action: The First Amendment’s 
Application—Or Lack Thereof—To Third-Party Platforms, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989, 996–99 
(2017) (arguing that the Supreme Court ruling in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), 
reflects the current formalistic trend). 
 157 See Peters, supra note 156, at 998 (discussing the boundaries between the private sector and 
constitutional rights).  
 158 See Keller, supra note 6, at 21–22 (arguing Halleck will unlikely “affect internet platforms directly”). 
 159 See Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735 (describing the Internet and social media in particular as the 
most important place for the exchange of ideas). 
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online rulers.  Many scholars have stressed the need to entirely abolish the 
state action doctrine.
160
  Whereas chances for such a legal move are low, 
Jonathan Peters proposed to look for a solution through state legislation in 
contrast to federal constitutional law: For instance, in California, the principle 
of freedom of speech is anchored as a right of every person to free speech and 
not as an obligation of the state to refrain from limiting free speech.  
Therefore, such a difference allows in California a broader application of 
freedom of speech on private properties as well—an application which was 
approved by the Supreme Court.
161
  Since many of the major online rulers are 
based in California, this was the proposed path for imposing free speech 
standards on the private sector.
162
  Alternatively, many expressed the need to 
ease the state action doctrine following the flexible interpretation given to the 
private/public divide in Marsh v. Alabama.163  Klonick, in contrast, reached the 
conclusion that imposition of free speech standards are not realistic in light of 
American public law principles.  Therefore, she argues that a better path 
would be the voluntary one, facilitated by complex social structures and 
market needs.
164
     
Following these scholarly attempts to turn free speech standards into an 
obligatory principle in the private sector, albeit on solid grounds and on a 
more global scale, the general percolation of human rights into the private 
sphere will be further described in following Part III.C. 
C. Dynamic Perceptions of the Public/Private Legal Spheres 
The traditional divide between public and private legal spheres has been 
challenged for decades, and there have been prominent legal developments 
 
 160 See Peller and Tushnet, supra note 144, at 789 (“The state action doctrine is analytically incoherent 
because, as Hohfeld and Hale demonstrated, state regulation of so-called private conduct is always 
present, as a matter of analytic necessity, within a legal order.  There is no region of social life that 
even conceptually can be marked off as ‘private’ and free from governmental regulation.”); 
Chemerinsky, supra note 140, at 506 (“The conclusion which emerges is that limiting the 
Constitution’s protections of individual rights to state action is anachronistic, harmful to the most 
important personal liberties, completely unnecessary, and even detrimental to the very goals that it 
originally intended to accomplish.”). 
 161 Peters, supra note 156, at 1001–04. 
 162 Id. at 1001–02. 
 163 See Peters, supra note 156, at 1022–23 (discussing Marsh); Langvardt, supra note 130, at 1366–67 
(same). 
 164 See Klonick, supra note 16, at 1659 (noting the challenges of categorizing social media platforms as 
state actors). 
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promoting the weakening of the dichotomic approach.
165
  The growth of 
powerful for-profit corporations in the 1950s and onwards has generated the 
legal discourse that questions whether some public law constrains should be 
imposed on corporate behavior.
166
  The process of privatization, in which 
public services are transferred into private entities’ hands, has further 
amplified this discourse, since it further blurred the dividing line between 
public and private spheres.
167
  Privatization, in fact, was supposed to be 
perceived as “publicization,” since public law norms such as accountability, 
due process, equality, and rationality might extend to private actors through 
budgeting, regulation, and contracts.
168
  As explained above, the U.S. state 
action doctrine could easily be triggered in clear-cut cases of state involvement, 
thereby introducing the entire set of public law standards into private sphere 
activity.
169
  The hard cases, where private activity has great public impact but 
no direct state “footprints,” are the controversial ones.  These hard cases 
 
 165 See Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423 
(1982) (chronicling the history of the public/private distinction); Aharon Barak, Constitutional 
Human Rights and Private Law, 3 REV. CONST. STUD. 218, 220, 225, 228 (1996) (describing Israeli 
law and other models for imposing public law obligations upon private parties); Sabino Cassese, New 
Paths for Administrative Law: A Manifesto, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 603, 607 (2012) (commenting on 
the public versus private conceptions in administrative law). 
 166 For example, already in 1957 Friedmann published his scholarly piece, questioning whether public 
law obligations should not be imposed on powerful corporations.  See Wolfgang G. Friedmann, 
Corporate Power, Government by Private Groups, and the Law, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 155, 165 (1957) 
(“[T]he question must be raised in all seriousness whether the ‘overmighty subjects’ of our time—the 
giant corporations, both of a commercial and non-commercial character, . . . have taken over the 
substance of sovereignty.”); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 133, at 510–511 (“[T]he concentration 
of wealth and power in private hands, for example, in large corporations, makes the effect of private 
actions in certain cases virtually indistinguishable from the impact of governmental conduct.”).  This 
discourse should not be mixed with more radical views, from a political science perspective, 
perceiving any corporate being an artificial entity created by law, as an entity that should be subject 
to some public law norms.  See, e.g., David Ciepley, Beyond Public and Private: Toward a Political 
Theory of the Corporation, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 139, 156 (2013) (stating corporations are 
“neither wholly private nor wholly public,” but exhibit properties of both). 
 167 Daphne Barak-Erez, A State Action Doctrine for an Age of Privatization, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1169 
(1995); Cheryl L. Wade, For-Profit Corporations That Perform Public Functions: Politics, Profit, 
and Poverty, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 323 (1999); Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and 
the New Administrative Law, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 813 (2000); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as 
Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public 
Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029 (2005). 
 168 See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 
1285 (2003) (suggesting privatization “can be a means of publicization”); see also Jack M. Beermann, 
Administrative-Law-Like Obligations on Private [Ized] Entities, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1717, 1731–34 
(2002) (discussing antidiscrimination law in the private sector). 
 169 Barak-Erez, supra note 160, at 1172. 
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concern, for instance, a public function utility, i.e. an activity that is public in 
nature (such as the one discussed in Marsh v. Alabama),170 or a private activity 
with an indirect state nexus, i.e. a “close” cooperation between the private 
entity and a state agent.
171
  Privatization, for instance, might fall into any of these 
two options.
172
       
From a broader perspective, public law, including its two sub-branches of 
administrative and constitutional law, is facing a gradual and consistent process 
in which it is percolating into private law.  Vast scholarly writing covers this 
phenomenon. Jody Freeman’s work, as well as that of other scholars, for 
instance, has unveiled both myths and the reality around the public/private 
dichotomy.
173
  After inspecting these two legal fields, following the Critical 
Legal Studies tradition, Freeman has concluded that there is a complex 
mechanism of constant “negotiation” between private and public actors, which 
ends up with intertwined legal outcomes.  The challenge of the traditional 
public/private divide is addressed from various perspectives, including the way 
public norms are crafted and enforced.
174
  She further argues that “There is no 
purely private realm and no purely public one" therefore scholarly attention 
should be focused on the . . .—"set of negotiated relationships between the 
public and the private.”
175
  Moreover, a non-dichotomic perception of the 
public/private realm led to the understanding that the application of public law 
standards may be a matter of degree, according to the relational public nature 




The European legal legacy and international law trends are more willing to 
accept the introduction of public law norms into the private sphere.  Such 
 
 170 See supra notes 142–140 and accompanying text. 
 171 See Barak-Erez, supra note 160, at 1178 (explaining the nexus theory of state activity). 
 172 This is the stance offered by an extensive scholarly movement. See id. 
 173 See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in the Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 548 (2000) 
(proposing a more realistic conception of the public/private distinction); Freeman, supra note 167.  
For similar conclusions, see Vandenbergh, supra note 167, at 2037–41 (discussing the important role 
of private actors in government functions). 
 174 See Freeman, supra note 173, at 636 (discussing the role of government associated with regulation).  
In that respect, the “nondelegation” doctrine is challenged as well.  Id. at 580–586 (analyzing the 
nondelegation doctrine).  For further criticism concerning the myth and reality with respect to the 
“nondelegation” doctrine, see Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
1367 (2003). 
 175 Freeman, supra note173, at 548. 
 176 See id. at 580 (commenting on this “essential dichotomy” between public and private). 
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acceptance is addressed by scholarly writings and could be seen in judicial 
decisions as well.  In the pre-digital era, during the 1980s and 1990s and along 
with the development of European Union Law, a growing body of scholarly 
writings was devoted to theoretical analysis concerning the application of 
human rights.  For instance, Andrew Clapham opened his 1993 book with the 
overall stance that:  
[It] challenges the presumption that the fundamental rights and 
freedoms contained in the European Convention on Human Rights 
are irrelevant for cases which concern the sphere of relations between 
individuals. . . . It is the application of human rights law to the action 
of private bodies which I label “human rights in the private sphere” or 
“the privatization of human rights.”
177
   
Following this path, in 2011 the U.N. published its Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights, calling for the compliance of all private entities 
with human rights.
178
  German law, in particular, is a prominent example of the 
application of human rights standards in the private sphere, since every 
provision of private law must be compatible with the system of values of 
German Basic Law (i.e. Constitutional Law), and every such provision must 
be interpreted in its spirit.
179
  In the seminal case of Lüth, discussing freedom 
of expression, the German Federal Constitutional Court held that basic rights 
are primarily to protect the citizen against the state, but as enacted in the 
German Constitution, they also incorporate an objective scale of values which 
applies, as a matter of constitutional law, throughout the entire legal system.
180
  
In this case, a film producer filed a lawsuit against Erich Lüth, who called to 
boycott his film due to the former’s anti-Semitic background.  The Court held 
that the introduction of human right standards into the relation of two 
individuals is a matter of degree, namely it is an indirect application in contrast 
to full and direct application as the case is with a state actor, yet in the specific 
 
 177 ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE 1 (1993). 
 178 See U.N. Human Rights, Office of the High Comm’r, Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights (Apr. 2011), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusi
nessHR_EN.pdf. 
 179 See DONALD P. KOMMERS & RUSSEL A. MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 444 (3d ed. 2012) (“Every provision of private law must be 
compatible with this system of values, and every such provision must be interpreted in its spirit.”). 
 180 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 15, 1958, 7 Entscheidungen 
des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVERFGE] 198.  See also Peter E. Quint, Free Speech and Private 
Law in German Constitutional Theory, 48 Md. L. R. 247 (1989) (reviewing the Lüth case and its 
impact on the full introduction of human rights into German private law). 
April 2021] HYBRID BODIES 389 
   
 
case freedom of speech prevails.
181
  This seminal case marked the opening of 
the European balancing era, namely an era of judicial balancing of competing 
constitutional rights, in private civil cases.
182
  The German Constitutional Court 
has further developed the horizontal application of constitutional rights in the 
private sphere in more recent cases.  Moreover, this contemporary application 
could arguably be perceived as direct.  For instance, in a case discussing the 
scope of freedom of expression in the premises of the Frankfurt Airport 
(“Fraport”), held in 2011, the German Constitutional Court ruled that since 
the State held seventy percent of the shares of the company that owned the 
airport’s premises (with the remaining thirty percent held by a private entity), 
the airport is bound to allow freedom of speech in the commercial parts of its 
premises.  The Court further stressed that as long as the privately owned 
spaces are intended for public use, freedom of expression applies in these 
public-use areas, which essentially constitute a “public forum.”
183
  Following 
this case, further decisions developing the horizontal application of 
constitutional rights were handed down;
184
 and in May 2019 the Court granted 
an interim order against Facebook, obliging the restoration (“put back”) of a 
far-right-wing political activist’s article that Facebook had blocked and 
monitored as “hate speech,” on the basis of horizontal application of freedom 
of expression as a constitutional right.
185
  The horizontal application of various 
 
 181 BVerfGE, supra note 180, at 204; Quint, supra note 180, at 260–261.  For the indirect application 
of constitutional rights in cases involving a private actor in German law, see Livia Fenger & Helena 
Lindemann, The FRAPORT Case of the First Senate of the German Federal Constitutional Court 
and Its Public Forum Doctrine: Case Note, 15 Ger. L.J. 1105 (2014) (discussing the German court 
decision in the FRAPORT case). 
 182 See Jacco Bomhoff, Luth’s 50th Anniversary: Some Comparative Observations on the German 
Foundations of Judicial Balancing, 9 GER. L.J. 121, 124 (2008). 
 183  BVerfG, Judgement of the First Senate of February 22, 2011—1 BVR699/06, English translation 
available at https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2011/02/rs2
0110222_1bvr069906en.html. 
 184 See BVerfG, Judgement of the First Senate of July 18, 2015—1 BvQ 25/15, no English translation, 
available at https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2015/07/qk
20150718_1bvq002515.html; BVerfG, Order of the First Senate of April 11, 2018—1 BvR 3080/09 
(ruling that “under specific circumstances, however, equality requirement relating to relationships 
between private actors may derive from Article 3(1) of the Basic Law. Article 3(1) of the Basic Law 
does have horizontal effects, inter alia, were private actors exercise 
their rights to enforce house rules under private law.”), English translation available at https://www.b
undesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2018/04/rs20180411_1bvr308009en.
html. 
 185 See BVerfG, Order of the Second Senate of May 22, 2019—1 BvQ 42/19, English abstract available 
at https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2019/05/qk20190522
_1bvq004219en.html. 
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Another legal path, accepting the introduction of public law norms into the 
private sphere, address the legal governing rules of various international 
bodies, which were established to monitor or coordinate global behavior.
187
  
Such bodies, being nongovernmental and usually not-for-profit organizations, 
are in fact private entities who nevertheless subordinate themselves to 
administrative law standards, at least to a certain extent.  These international 
organizations, therefore, have led to the gradual development of the notion of 
Global Administrative Law, which adheres the application of basic public law 
standards by non-state actors.
188
  Thereby, these bodies were categorized as 
special, hybrid public/private bodies.
189
  The development of Global 
Administrative Law has attracted much legal attention.  Within this legal 
discourse, the notion of accountability was developed as a standard that should 
be applied on a global scale and outside the traditional and narrow state-
individuals scope.
190
  The notion of accountability in itself denotes a line of 
basic administrative law standards, including transparency, reasoned decisions, 
and independent review.
191
  The development of a special Global 
Administrative Law for non-state global hybrid bodies raises the general issue 
of hybrid bodies that will be further explored in Part III.D. 
 
 186 For a review of various EU cases applying human rights in the private sphere, see Eleni Frantziou, 
The Horizontal Effect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU: Rediscovering the Reasons 
for Horizontality, 21 EUR. L.J. 657 (2015). 
 187 Such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Anti-Doping Agency (ADA) or the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).  For a taxonomy of these bodies, see 
Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative 
Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 20–23 (2005). 
 188 Id. at 22–23; see also Sebastian Lopez Escarcena, Contextualizing Global Administrative Law, 21 
GONZ. J. INT’L L. 57 (2018); Christoph Mollers, Ten Years of Global Administrative Law, 13 INT’L 
J. CONST. L. 469 (2015); Susan Marks, Naming Global Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. 
& POL’Y. 995 (2005); Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global 
Administrative Law, 68 L.  & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (2005). 
 189 See Kingsbury, supra note 187, at 16–17, 20. 
 190 See id. at 17. See also Danielle Hanna Rached, Doomed Aspiration of Pure Instrumentality: Global 
Administrative Law and Accountability, 3 GLOBAL CONST. 338 (2014); David Dyzenhaus, 
Accountability and the Concept of (Global) Administrative Law, 2009 ACTA JURIDICA, 3 (2009); 
Simon Chesterman, Globalization Rules: Accountability, Power, and the Prospects for Global 
Administrative Law, 14 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 39 (2008). 
 191 See Kingsbury, supra note 187, at 37–40 (discussing how global administrative law has provided 
transparency, reasoned decisions, and right of review). 
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D. The Doctrine of Hybrid Bodies 
The discussion above stressed the profound gaps between the accepting 
European approach to human rights standards in the private sphere in contrast 
to the seemingly negative U.S. approach on the matter.  However, legal reality 
is a lot more complex.  For example, while the German approach allows only 
indirect application of human right standards in all potential civil law cases, the 
American approach only scantly allowed such application as an interpretive 
extension of the state-action doctrine—but when it did allow such an 
interpretive move, the application of human rights standards in the private 
sphere was direct.192  The different paths taken by the two legal systems has 
generated different legal developments. One of such developments is the 
notion of a hybrid public/private body, which since it encompasses a mix of 
characteristics, it allows European countries to directly impose certain human 
rights standards.  Namely, concerning the general indirect imposition of 
human rights in the private sphere, the doctrine further evolved to locate 
specific “islands” in the private sphere in which some direct obligations could 
nevertheless be imposed.  Therefore, the doctrine of hybrid bodies may create 
an appropriate bridge between the two legal approaches if the American state-
action doctrine would be interpretively stretched to cover at least robust cases 
of hybrid bodies.  In such case, both European and U.S. laws would allow a 
concrete, direct application of public law norms in the private sphere and thus 
create a coherent global norm for global hybrid bodies. 
The doctrine of hybrid bodies is extensively discussed in the United 
Kingdom. Article 6 to the Human Rights Act 1998 (the Human Rights Act) 
stipulates that the obligations of public authorities apply to any person or body 
performing “functions of a public nature.”
193
  Namely, the Human Rights Act 
explicitly acknowledges the potential application of human rights standards on 
private bodies, and the question is when such application is appropriate 
 
 192 Compare the German holding in the Lüth Case BVerfG, supra note 180 (applying human rights 
indirectly), with the U.S. holding in the case of Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (using human 
rights as a limitation of the law).  See also Quint, supra note 180, at 273 (explaining how U.S. law 
differs from German law in disputers between individuals). 
 193 See Human Rights Act 1998, c.42 § 6(1) (UK) (proclaiming that “it is unlawful for a public authority 
to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right”); see also id. § 6(3) (proclaiming “In 
this section ‘public authority’ includes— (a) a court or tribunal, and (b) any person certain of whose 
functions are functions of a public nature.”) 
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according to domestic court decisions.
194
  The hybrid bodies doctrine, i.e. 
imposition of human rights standards on private bodies, was applied in cases 
of privately run prisons or in similar cases of private psychiatric hospitals 
exercising compulsory detention.
195
  The doctrine was also applied in the pre-
Human Rights Act era, in a seminal case held in 1987 concerning the Panel 
on Takeovers and Mergers, a regulatory body operated on a municipal level 
with enforcing powers.  The Court held that since the powers exercised by the 
Panel were essentially in the domain of public law, it should be subject to 
judicial review.
196
  Since the Human Rights Act’s term “functions of a public 
nature” is very vague, the application of the hybrid bodies doctrine is an 
interpretive matter subject to policy considerations.
197
  Naturally, therefore, the 
question of whether the hybrid bodies doctrine should be further extended to 
other “grey areas” is controversial.
198
 
An outstanding example of the controversy is demonstrated in the case of 
Birmingham City Council (BCC) held by the House of Lords in 2007, 
discussing whether a care home, providing accommodation and care to 
residents pursuant to arrangements made with a local authority, is subject to 
direct public law standards despite it being a privately owned and run 
company.
199
  Lord Bingham adhered to a flexible measure, according to which 
“there is no single test of universal application to determine whether a function 
is of a public nature,”
200
 and there are many factors that should be considered 
 
 194 See Aston Cantlow v. Wallbank [2003] 3 All. ENG. REP. 1213, at ¶ 6 (HL) (“The broad purpose 
sought to be achieved by [section] 6(1) is not in doubt. The purpose is that those bodies for whose 
acts the state is answerable before the European Court of Human Rights shall in future be subject to 
a domestic law obligation not to act incompatibly with convention rights.  If they act in breach of this 
legal obligation victims may henceforth obtain redress from the courts of this country.  In future 
victims should not need to travel to Strasbourg.”).  See also YL v. Birmingham City Council (2007) 
3 All ENG. REP. 957 (HL) at ¶¶ 4, 20, 55, 86–87 [hereinafter the BCC case]. 
195  See R v. Partnerships in Care Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 2610, 2619. 
196  R v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc [1987] QB 815. 
197  See Aston Cantlow, 3 All. ENG. REP. at ¶ 12 (“What, then, is the touchstone to be used in deciding 
whether a function is public for this purpose? Clearly there is no single test of universal application. 
There cannot be, given the diverse nature of governmental functions and the variety of means by 
which these functions are discharged today. Factors to be taken into account include the extent to 
which in carrying out the relevant function the body is publicly funded, or is exercising statutory 
powers, or is taking the place of central government or local authorities, or is providing a public 
service.”). 
The BCC case, supra note 191, at ¶ 128. 
198  See H.W.R. WADE & C.F. FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 538 (11th ed. 2014). 
 199 See the BCC case, supra note 191, at ¶ 1 (Bingham, L.J., dissenting). 
 200 Id. ¶ 5 (Bingham, L.J., dissenting). 
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on a case-by-case basis, such as the nature of the service, the degree of state 
involvement (whether by payment, regulation, or by any other means), and the 
extent of the risk that the function at stake might violate an individual’s human 
right.
201
  Baroness Hale joined, adding another important factor, which is the 
public interest in having that task undertaken.
202
  Yet, the majority of the three 
other Lords (Scott, Mance, and Neuberger) dismissed the appeal on the basis 
of policy considerations.  The majority’s opinion stressed that this case should 
be distinguished from former decisions, since it did not meet a core delegation 
of public authority, as the specific arrangement focused on residents that fell 
outside the public scheme, and the care home served simply as a contractor 
or a supplier of a public authority.
203
  Nevertheless, Lord Mance further 
stressed that the refusal to apply the entire public law standard at stake does 
not mean that no standards should apply at all.  To the contrary: “Apart from 
any contractual arrangements, the care home should view and treat all such 
residents with equality.”
204
  In other words, the application of public law 
standards is always a matter of degree. 
In other states, such as Israel, the doctrine of hybrid bodies is highly 
popular, and it can be applied in a wide range of cases.  Under Israeli common 
law, private entities that control public resources, supply a basic social need, 
or fulfil a public function in nature, or whose function may promote social 
values under necessity may altogether be imposed upon by Court to apply 
certain administrative law standards, being acknowledged as hybrid bodies.
205
  
This court-made rule raises the question of whether in other Anglo-American 
legal systems, common law could serve as a legal basis for the adoption of the 
hybrid bodies doctrine as well.  At least one commentator raised such a 
question with respect to U.S. common law, even if considering the current 
formalistic approach of the U.S. Supreme Court as to the state action 
doctrine.
206
  Moreover, it was suggested that the imposition of public law 
 
 201 See id. ¶ 5–11 (Bingham, L.J., dissenting). 
 202 See id. ¶ 67 (Hale, B., dissenting). 
 203 See id. at par. 115–17 (explaining that the specific service at stake was tailored for “self-funders” 
residency, and therefore had a more commercial nature than public service); id. ¶ 141 (explaining 
that contractors and suppliers of the government should not be regarded as hybrid bodies). 
 204 See id. ¶ 119. 
 205 See Barak, supra note 162, at 220–21. 
 206 See Henry H. Perritt, Towards a Hybrid Regulatory Scheme for the Internet, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 215, 268 (2001) (stating that “the regular courts did a good job of working out touchstones for 
internet jurisdiction. They can do the same with respect to touchstones for accountable private 
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standards on online rulers could be done in jurisdictions outside the U.S., or 
by international organizations, which would inevitably generate an impact on 
these entities’ conduct in the U.S. domestic arena as well.
207
 
IV. ONLINE RULERS AS HYBRID BODIES 
A. Application of the Hybrid Bodies Doctrine to Online Rulers 
Considering the central role of online rulers in the current digital societal 
structure and the rising importance of Digital Human Rights, the question is 
whether time is ripe for imposing some public law standards on relevant online 
actors.  The scholarly voice adhering such legal move is growing stronger.
208
  
Already during the dawn of the Internet, it was apparent that despite the wish 
for it to be an entire free zone of conduct, some regulation would be inevitably 
imposed.
209
  After almost two decades, scholars have proposed to perceive 




regulation of the Internet”). See also Berman, supra note 107, at 1270, 1289–93 (challenging the ill-
consequences of the state action doctrine by adoption of constitutional principles in the civil society 
as common and shared values, on a cultural level). 
 207 See Perritt, supra note 206, at 268. See also Laurence R. Helfer & Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing 
Non-National Systems: The Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 141, 241 (2001) (stressing that international organizations could potentially insert 
public law norms into the operation of national private entities: “Admittedly, ISPs are nominally 
applying United States copyright law to these disputes, not non-national or international law. 
However, the rules applicable to notice and take down disputes may well evolve away from purely 
national roots toward contract enshrined norms and practices not tied to any particular prescriptive 
authority”). 
 208 See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 128; Aswad, supra note 124; Bloch-Wehba, supra note 5; Keller, Who 
Do You Sue?, supra note 6. See also Derek E. Bambauer, Cybersieves, 59 DUKE L.J. 377, 379, 393–
401 (2009) (proposing the global democratic procedural principles of accountability and transparency 
for the operation of the “cyberspace,” without any pre value-based assumptions); JULIE E. COHEN, 
CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 224 
(2012) (proposing more operational transparency by online intermediaries); Ira Steven Nathenson, 
Super-Intermediaries, Code, Human Rights, 8 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 19, 149–168 
(2013) (proposing the application of “Digital Due Process” to online intermediaries, including three 
major parameters: accuracy, transparency, and participation). 
 209 See Perritt, supra note 206, at 266. 
 210 See K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and the Revival of 
the Public Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1668–70 (2018) (arguing that Internet 
platforms take on the characteristics of infrastructure and ought to be regulated as public utilities); 
see also supra note 131. 
April 2021] HYBRID BODIES 395 
   
 
or as entities which govern the backbone of democracy,
211
 which therefore 
should be subject to some basic public law principles.  The legal consequence 
for imposing public law standards would be varied and may include obligations 
for setting clear and transparent rules of operation, for securing equality 
between all users, for giving reasoned decisions, and a right to file an appeal 
with respect to such decisions to an objective quasi-judicial body.  In other 
words, these online rulers should serve as gatekeepers for digital human rights 
who therefore would be subject to some administrative law standards, akin to 
the Global Administrative Law trend. 
The next question is what the legal mechanism for promoting such legal 
move should be, and whether the doctrine of hybrid bodies is apt for such a 
task.  With respect to mass media, already in 1997, in the pre-Human Rights 
Act era, the British Court left open the issue of whether a private radio station 
should be subject to judicial review, while stressing the important public 
function of radio services.
212
  One could expect that twenty years later, in light 
of the emergence of the digital environment described above, and considering 
the important role of Digital Human Rights and freedom of speech, some of 
the major online rulers would be perceived as serving at least some public 
function and therefore should apply at least some public law standards.  
However, in the British case of Richardson v. Facebook, held in 2015, the 
High Court of Justice refused to hold Facebook and Google as hybrid bodies 
under British domestic law.
213
  In rejecting such legal interpretation, the Court 
referred to the BCC holding, and specifically to Baroness Hale’s reasoning, 
according to which in order for a private body to be regarded hybrid under 
the Human Rights Act, it needs to carry out a function on behalf of the public 
and be initially assumed responsible by the state, for example by the state’s 




 211 See Eyal Benvenisti, Upholding Democracy Amid the Challenges of New Technology: What Role 
for Global Governance?, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9, 55–56, 71 (2018) (“The private social media 
providers and other ICT companies shape the contemporary governance sphere due to their 
possession of two major resources: their control of our channels of communication and, from this, 
their ability to accumulate vast amounts of data that is necessary for commercial and governance 
purposes.”). 
 212 See R. v. British Broadcasting Corp., ex parte Referendum Party. [1997] EMLR 605 (discussing the 
criteria for time allocation of parties’ political campaign before elections). 
 213 See Richardson v. Facebook & Richardson v. Google, [2015] EWHC 3154, at par. 63 (QB) (holding 
that “Facebook does not act ‘in the public interest’ in the relevant sense, nor can it conceivably be 
described as performing ‘functions of a public nature’”). 
 214 See id. 
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The British Court in the Richardson v. Facebook case preferred a very 
narrow interpretation to the hybrid bodies doctrine, even if it leaned on the 
BCC holding.  The very short reasoning in this case is not self-explanatory, 
and it does not present any underlying policy considerations.  What 
parameters would determine which function is conducted on behalf of the 
public?  Is the test asking whether the state would initially be willing to pay for 
such a service is a relevant one today?  The court ignored the centrality of 
Internet intermediaries in the current societal structure, and it did not take 
into consideration the function of online platforms as the public digital market 
square.  Moreover, this decision ignores the current reality, in which the 
private sector initiates cutting-edge functions, based on mass public use, that 
no state could initially pay for.  As the public sphere is evolving, the term 
“public function” should be a dynamic one as well. 
There are several advantages in using the hybrid bodies doctrine for 
imposing obligations on major online rulers.  First, the mere acknowledgment 
of an entity as a hybrid body is only the opening declarative step that should 
be followed by an in-depth analysis of the concrete public law standards 
applicable at stake, which should be made on a case-by-case basis.  Truly, once 
a set of standards is tailored in a certain case, it would reasonably apply to 
future similar cases.  However, in contrast to pure state obligations, the 
application of public law standards on hybrid bodies could be partial or 
gradual in terms of time and place.
215
  As hybrid bodies are located in between 
the private and public spheres, the correlative obligations are a matter of 
degree that should be designed in accordance to the “weight” of the core 
nature of the service at stake as a “public function.”  In that sense, the hybrid 
bodies doctrine is a dynamic one.
216
  The inherent flexibilities of the hybrid 
bodies doctrine are of great importance to the case of online rulers, since they 
involve a complex set of competing interests, including various clashing Digital 
Human Rights: those of the platforms versus those of the users.
217
  The 
dynamic and gradual model allows all stakeholders a deliberative adaption of 
 
 215 See Perritt, supra note 206, at 266 (observing, already in 2001, that some policy with respect to the 
Internet governance should be developed, stating that “they need some rough, practical benchmarks 
to decide where private regulation should stop and public regulation begin. They need to be able to 
define the boundaries, at least rough boundaries, between the public and private spheres.”). 
 216 See the BCC case, supra note 194. 
 217 See Van Loo, supra note 2, at 1327 (arguing that regulators must take an interdisciplinary approach 
in order to create integrated rules). 
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their acts and behavior, and in that regard, to a degree it emulates soft 
regulation mechanisms, such as codes of conduct.
218
 
Second, a major advantage of the hybrid bodies doctrine in the context of 
online rulers is its global reach.  The doctrine implies the use of basic 
administrative law standards, which are common in all democracies.  
Moreover, as explained above, in the past few decades, Global Administrative 
Law has been a developing legal branch of public law, where supra-state 
authorities operate in accordance with certain shared core administrative 
standards of accountability.
219
  It would be perfectly in line to further stretch its 
reach to global, multinational, online corporations.
220
  Internet governance 
could not be left up to domestic rules for long,
221
 and there are growing signs 
of cross-border regulation (except for the EU level).
222
 
Finally, the adoption of the hybrid bodies doctrine could be done via 
various legal paths that would fit diverse legal traditions.  It may be adopted by 
a Court ruling, following the British tradition that allows direct application of 
the doctrine via the Human Rights Act.
223
  It may follow the German tradition, 
which allows indirect application of human rights standards in all areas of law.
224
  
It may also be adopted by a concrete piece of legislation, as it was done in 
several European countries, such as the new German legislation imposing 
certain obligations on a major social network, such as transparent decision-
making concerning the removal of hate speech.
225
  Although this legislation is 
 
 218 See Perritt, supra note 206, at 301–05 (discussing a wide range of duties and standards that could be 
imposed on online private entities, such as: accountability, independent self-regulatory bodies, 
inclusion of public representatives in such bodies, application of the measure of proportionality, 
rationality, fair process); see also supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text. 
 219 See supra notes 181–81 and accompanying text. 
 220 See Benvenisti, supra note 211, at 71, 79–81 (arguing, in the context of access to big data, which is 
generated by major online corporations, that the imposition of some global administrative principles 
over these private entities is justified). 
 221 See MacKinnon et al., supra note 48, at 22–25. 
 222 See Andrew Keane Woods, Litigating Data Sovereignty, 128 YALE L.J. 328 (2018) (exploring case 
law challenging national sovereignty against large internet firms); see also Google Inc. v. Equustek 
Solutions Inc. [2017] 1 S.C.R, 824 (granting a (controversial) “global injunction”). 
 223 See supra notes 186–87 and accompanying text (describing how the notion of a hybrid public/private 
body allows the United Kingdom to directly impose certain human rights standards). 
 224 See supra notes 172–71 and accompanying text (discussing German law’s application of human rights 
standards in the private and public spheres). 
 225 Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz [NetzDG] [Network Enforcement Act], Sept. 1, 2017, 
Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz [BMJV] at 3352 (Ger.); see Thomas 
Wischmeyer, ‘What is Illegal Offline is Also Illegal Online’—The German Network Enforcement 
 
398 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 23:2 
   
 
aimed at pushing online platforms to remove content, and some fear the ill-
consequences of such removal on legal content and free speech,
226
 it 
nevertheless serves as an example for the upfront introduction of public law 
obligations on private bodies, keeping in mind democratic values.
227
  Yet, if a 
legislative measure is taken, it should reflect a balanced mechanism, protecting 
free speech as its underlying rational.
228
  The question remains as to the 
doctrine’s adaptability to U.S. law.  Despite the rigid trend of the U.S. 
Supreme Court concerning the scope of state action doctrine, there is still 
room for the adoption of the hybrid bodies doctrine by U.S. courts, as both 
doctrines are basically interpretive legal tools.  As it was suggested, the U.S. 
Supreme Court needs only to be convinced that the relevant question is how 
a “space” is used and not just who owns it when deciding if it is “public.”
229
  
Moreover, once the Court ruled that a private stakeholder at stake is 
nevertheless a “state actor” for that purpose, then it would take only one step 
further, in line with the state action doctrine, to conclude that in such a case a 
dynamic set of public law standards may apply.
230
  Although dissenting, in the 
 
Act 2017, in FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PROTECTION ONLINE: THE FUTURE REGULATION OF 
INTERMEDIARIES 28–56 (Bilyana Petkova & Tuomas Ojanen eds., Elgar 2019) (providing a review 
and analysis of this new enactment and its social and political background). 
 226 See Mathias Hong, The German Network Enforcement Act and The Presumption In Favour of 
Freedom of Speech, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Jan. 22, 2018), https://verfassungsblog.de/the-german-
network-enforcement-act-and-the-presumption-in-favour-of-freedom-of-speech/ (arguing that “the 
regulatory model of the NetzDG . . . amounts to a call for massive ‘overblocking’”). 
 227 See Heidi Tworek, How Germany is Tackling Hate Speech, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (May 16, 2017), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/germany/2017-05-16/how-germany-tackling-hate-speech 
(describing Germany’s long-held belief in limiting free speech to protect democracy). See also 
Wischmeyer, supra note 225, at 7 (claiming that “the NEA compels companies to consider in their 
assessment of what can be posted online also [German] fundamental rights.  In this sense, the NEA 
can also be understood as part of the business and human rights movement”). 
 228 See Hong, supra note 226 (claiming that: “[W]hen balancing freedoms of expression against other 
protected interests, there is a fundamental presumption in favour of freedom of speech. This 
presumption applies at least to speech on matters which substantially affect the public . . . . The 
presumption in favour of freedom of speech also [indirectly] binds private Internet companies such 
as Facebook, Google, and Twitter. Since Lüth it was [also] applied to the general so-called indirect 
third-party effect of freedom of expression in private relations.”). 
 229 See Developments in the Law: State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 123 HARV. L. REV. 
1248, 1310 (2010); Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: 
Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1306 (1998) (arguing that 
cyberspace changes the traditional notions of location in the context of sovereignty and regimes of 
law). 
 230 See Mor, supra note 127 (expressing a similar view on “applying public law norms” to social network 
sites); Nathenson, supra note 205, at 149–56 (proposing the application of “Digital Due Process” on 
online intermediaries). 
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very recent case of Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck, four 
Justices thought that a private cable TV operator is subject to freedom of 
speech obligations due to the fact that it operated under a state contract that 
supplied the physical infrastructure and nothing more.
231
  It remains to be seen 
how the American courts would rule in the case of a mega-online ruler’s 
conflict with a robust user’s Digital Human Right. 
B. The Infringing Content Monitoring Case Study 
Allegedly copyright infringing content monitoring could serve as a case 
study.  As described above, content monitoring creates a major hurdle to the 
accomplishment of Digital Human Rights, whether it is done by the American 
mechanism of notice-and-takedown or the European style of blocking 
orders.
232
  Legal content and speech thus may be foreclosed. Can online rulers 
be indifferent to such results?  Can they simply remove or block content upon 
an ex-parte request?  Should there be any procedural safeguards for the non-
represented users?  Should there be any procedural safeguards for balancing 
Digital Human Rights? 
Let’s inspect more closely the path of blocking orders, which is seemingly 
applicable in the U.S. as well.
233
  In these cases, a major copyright stakeholder 
usually reaches out to an ISP or a platform, requesting to block a website that 
contains allegedly infringing materials.  The ISP/platform is an uninvolved 
third party, caught between the applicant and the alleged infringer.  As a private 
corporation, it wishes to diminish any legal risk and expenses, therefore the 
immediate default would be to block.  Even if the ISP/platform enjoys 
immunity under a domestic scheme, it may still prefer to block the website, 
since the immunity’s scope is national.  The ISP/platform’s indifference on 
the matter is deeply rooted in its basic motivation.  Therefore, even if domestic 
law requires a mandatory judicial blocking order and prohibits voluntary 
blocking, the ISP/platform nevertheless would not voluntarily oppose such a 
request and would not voluntarily invest resources to challenge an order that 
is granted on an ex-parte basis.234  The problem is clear: The public’s voice is 
not heard in these cases, and therefore the final decision may be one-sided.  
 
 231 Supra text accompanying note 148. 
 232 Supra part II.B. 
 233 See supra notes 77–71 (noting that blocking orders may be granted on a global scale). 
 234 See SECONDARY LIABILITY OF INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS (Graeme B. Dinwoodie ed., 2017) 
(offering a comparative survey of “secondary liability” imposed on online intermediaries). 
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The ISP/platform would act as an uninvolved private actor, even though it 
serves a public function in nature.  The same pattern occurs with respect to 
the notice-and-take down schemes, in which the online intermediary’s prime 
interest is to escape the conflict with minimum expenses and the least amount 
of harm.
235
  The outcome is lack of representation of the public interest and 
potential harm to users’ Digital Human Rights. 
By contrast, if the ISP/platform were to be acknowledged as a hybrid body, 
then there is room for discussing its obligations, stemming from its 
accountability to guarantee the public’s Digital Human Rights.  For instance, 
the ISP/platform may be expected to reveal all relevant information it holds 
relating to the blocking request at stake; it may be obliged to actively seek for 
the alleged infringer response; it may be obliged to apply for judicial review on 
the matter; and if the request is discussed in court, it may be obliged to actively 
express its reasoned opinion why it is justified or not justified to block the 
content in the specific case.  In other words, the mere status of a hybrid body 
does not automatically entail the imposition of all state obligations, but rather 
stresses that the ISP/platform cannot behave indifferently to the case.  The 
ISP/platform should perceive itself, to a certain extent, as a facilitator of the 
public interest, which he commercially serves.  In other words, the 
ISP/platform is expected to perform certain gatekeeper duties.
236
                               
The Copyright Single Market Directive, described above,
 237
 provided a 
significant move for imposing obligations on online rulers, yet it was criticized 
for imposing such obligations mainly in favor of copyright holders.  
Considering this result, the importance of applying the hybrid bodies doctrine 
on the very same entities becomes even more crucial and urgent, since it may 
provide the judiciary with adequate means to implement the complimentary 
obligations in favor of users and the public at large.  Once the legislature has 
adopted an active obligation of online rulers to monitor content, there is no 
reason or justification not to allow the parallel mandatory mechanism for 
promoting a balanced digital speech environment.  Whereas the first step was 
conducted by the legislature, the door was open to the adoption of the flip side 
 
 235 See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text (describing online intermediaries’ incentives under § 
512 of the Copyright Act). 
 236 An analogy could be drawn from corporate law. See, e.g, Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 
S. CAL. L. REV. 53 (2003) (observing that the notion that a company and its executives serve as public 
interest gatekeepers is widely accepted in corporate law). 
 237 See supra notes 84–78, 94–93 and accompanying text. 
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of the coin through judicial discretion.  For example, Article 17 to the 
Copyright Single Market Directive requires online service providers to provide 
rightsholders, at their request, with adequate information concerning the 
“functioning of their practices” with regard to the cooperation between the 
parties.
238
  Being a hybrid body, which thereby is obliged to standards of 
transparency and equality, this information should be provided to any 
stakeholder, such as users.  In other words, this information should be open 
to the public.
239
  Moreover, it could also be argued that users are entitled to the 
very same complementary information concerning the functioning of the 
online service providers' practices” taken for ensuring that legal content is not 
removed.  This is particularly true in light of Article 17 explicit clarification 
that “The cooperation between online content-sharing service providers and 
rightholders shall not result in the prevention of the availability of works or 
other subject matter uploaded by users, which do not infringe copyright,” and 
especially if the use of the work is permitted by national exceptions and 
limitations.
240
 The measures employed should therefore be applied to serve 
both conflicting sides, since a hybrid body could not favor or discriminate any 
party.241  In other words, though the Copyright Single Market Directive 
presents an asymmetric balance, the judicial doctrine may provide the 
adequate counterweight, which may lead to a final, symmetric constitutional 
application of obligations.
242
  Article 17 (9) further establishes a mechanism 
akin to the American notice-and-takedown scheme, and emphasizes that out-
of-court redress mechanisms for settling disputes “impartially” should be 
available for users.
243
  Being a hybrid body, the online service provider would 
 
 238 See supra note 90. 
239  It should be noted that Article 17 (10) states that the Commission will organize stakeholder dialogues 
to discuss best practices for cooperation between the parties, and that "For the purpose of the 
stakeholder dialogues, users' organisations shall have access to adequate information from online 
service providers on the functioning of their practices with regard to paragraph 4." In other words, 
while the Copyright Single Market Directive acknowledges the users' legitimate interest to have access 
to this information, it nevertheless does not acknowledge a fully-fledged entitlement of access to such 
information.    
240  See Copyright Digital Single Market Directive, supra note 76, at 120 (Article 17 (7)). 
 241 For a similar view, see Romero-Moreno, supra note 98, at 201 (arguing that the then proposed Article 
13—currently Article 17—is inconsistent with the fundamental principle of “equality of arms,” namely 
that “each party must be afforded a fair opportunity to argue their case under conditions which do 
not put them at a substantial disadvantage vis-a-vis their opponent,” since it fails to provide equal 
procedural safeguards to users). 
 242 For a similar view concerning the German Internet Enforcement Act (2017), see Hong, supra note 
226. 
 243 See supra note 86; Copyright Digital Single Market Directive, supra note 82, at 121. 
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be obliged therefore not only to set up such  mechanisms but to ensure that 
they are operated independently and to fully reveal the procedural work of the 
mechanisms' operating bodies to verify their  impartiality.  Otherwise, the 
requirement for an impartial out-of-courts dispute resolution mechanism will 
not be guaranteed. Moreover, these independent, though in-house, bodies 
should be obliged as hybrid bodies to give reasons for their decisions, and 
such decisions should be exposed to external judicial review.
244
 
The common arguments against the introduction of administrative law 
standards into the operation of online rulers are that (a) it would prevent fast 
content monitoring operated by automated machines (algorithmic 
monitoring); (b) it stresses a default of non-removal, which then favors users 
over rightsholders; and (c) it would place a heavy burden on the judiciary due 
to the large amount of everyday conflicts.
245
  There are several answers to these 
arguments. Concerning the automated mode of operation, the argument is 
cyclic, since the question is indeed what the working assumptions of the 
algorithm would be.  Even in the case of various kinds of artificial intelligence 
systems, the initial dataset is still designed according to human policy 
considerations.
246
  Therefore, administrative standards do not contradict the 
use of systems supported by artificial intelligence.  There are some examples 
of cutting-edge artificial intelligence systems that are used in support of judicial 
decision-making processes;
247
 therefore a deliberative, transparent artificial 
intelligence system could be designed for the initial process of content 
monitoring as well.  Concerning the question of what the default principle 
should be in cases of disagreement—removal or non-removal of content—the 
 
 244 For a similar view, see Bloch-Wehba, supra note 5, at 80; Langvardt, supra note 104, at 394; Kadri 
& Klonick, supra note 138.  It should be noted that according to Article 17 (9), the dispute resolution 
mechanism should be “without prejudice to the rights of users to have recourse to efficient judicial 
remedies.”  See Copyright Digital Single Market Directive, supra note 81, at 121.  Therefore, the 
Copyright Digital Single Market Directive only implicitly acknowledge, if at all, that online service 
providers are obliged to hand reasoned decisions. 
 245 See Bloch-Wehba, supra note 5, at 78–79. 
 246 See Elkin-Koren & Perel, supra note 67, 8 (describing the uses of AI in the legal system). 
 247 For example, the COMPAS system assess potential recidivism risk. Its use for supporting sentencing 
decisions was approved by court in some states.  See, e.g., Criminal Law –– Sentencing Guidelines –
– Wisconsin Supreme Court Requires Warning Before Use of Algorithmic Risk Assessments in 
Sentencing. –– State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016), 130 HARV. L. REV. 1530, 1530–32 
(2017) (describing a case involving this issue).  See also, Michael Veale, Algorithms in the Criminal 
Justice System, THE LAW SOC’Y OF ENG. AND WALES (2019), 
https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-services/research-trends/algorithm-use-in-the-criminal-justice-
system-report/ (summarizing the potential and pitfalls of AI algorithms in criminal justice) 
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answer is that the algorithm could be designed with a “tree” of possibilities 
assessing the strength of the copyright infringement allegation, and the needed 
weight for an automatic decision of interim removal.
248
  The algorithm could 
also be designed in a way that transfers hard cases to human decision-making 
for the interim period until they are assessed by the independent in-house 
body for disputes.
249
 And most importantly, both the algorithm’s design and 
the manual policy for interim decisions should be transparent.
250
  Finally, 
concerning the fear of over-burdening the judiciary, if this is a consideration at 
all for excluding a body merited for judicial review, then the answer is twofold.  
First, such fears are often rebutted.  Following the common law tradition, after 
a line of reasoned decision is handed down, more clarity and certainty would 
be created, thus fewer cases on the matter would be appealed on court.  
Second, the judicial review may be conducted by a professional administrative 
tribunal, which despite not cutting the public expenditure would nevertheless 
save precious judicial time.
251
 
C. Alternative Measures: Antitrust Laws 
The fear that too much power in the digital realm is in the hands of few 
private companies clearly leads to the question of whether the problem can 
 
 248 For a similar view, concerning recommendations for improving content ID systems in a way that 
would reduce “false positive” outcomes, see Lester & Pachamanova, supra note 100, at 67–72. 
 249 In line with this stance, Article 17 (9) to the Copyright Digital Single Market Directive obliges 
decisions to remove content following complaints to be “subject to human review.” See Copyright 
Digital Single Market Directive, supra note 82, at 121.  For the need to require a better oversight over 
content ID systems’ performances, see Lester and Pachamanova, supra note 100, at 72. 
 250 For the view that algorithms in public use should be transparent, see Benvenisti, supra note 211, at 
60–61.  See also, Joshua A. Kroll, Joanna Huey, Solon Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel R. 
Reidenberg, David G. Robinson, & Harlan Yu, Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 
657–60 (2017) (claiming that transparency is often essential for accountability but that in many cases 
transparency is not enough). 
251 In Italy and Spain, the ordering of website blocking was entrusted to a specialized administrative 
authority, which therefore is obliged to consider human rights’ implications. See Martin Husovec, 
How Europe Wants to Redefine Global Online Copyright Enforcement, in PLURALISM OR 
UNIVERSALISM IN INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW 513, 522 (2019) (elaborating on the Italian 
model of regulation). 
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and should be treated by antitrust laws.
252
  Under § 2 of the Sherman Act,253 as 
interpreted by courts, a monopoly that was acquired through prohibited 
conduct, such as exclusive dealing, price discrimination, product 
tying and predatory pricing, has committed an offense which is subject to 
judicial remedies.
254
  These remedies may include forcing large organizations 
to be broken up, be run subject to positive obligations, and massive penalties 
may be imposed.
255
  Therefore, the problem described above, of the 
dominancy of the online rulers in the digital speech environment may be 
potentially treated by the alternative path of antitrust remedies: either by 
forcing the mega online rulers to break-up into smaller corporations or by 
setting positive obligations, such as the ones discussed above, concerning 
quasi-administrative virtues.  The U.S. antitrust agencies, which are also 
mandated to protect consumers, have already taken measures against major 
online platforms in order to prevent conduct harmful to consumers, such as 
misrepresenting security or privacy practices.
256
  Yet, the issue of content 
monitoring and free speech concerns have not been regulated by these 
agencies thus far. 
While there exists a potential alternative antitrust path, it is less realistic to 
tackle the specific problem of threat to freedom of speech.  Antitrust law, 
 
 252 See Terrell McSweeny, FTC 2.0: Keeping Pace with Online Platforms, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1027, 1028–30 (2017) (proposing antitrust enforcement under the FTC Act as a tool for treating the 
online platforms’ over market power). See also Jack Nicas, Karen Weise & Mike Isaac, How Each 
Big Tech Company May Be Targeted by Regulators, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/08/technology/antitrust-amazon-apple-facebook-google.html 
(outlining the scope of government investigations and potential action against large tech firms). 
 253 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2018). 
 254 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (citing Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 
U.S. 332, 343).  See also Gregory J. Werden, Antitrust’s Rule of Reason: Only Competition Matters, 
79 ANTITRUST L.J. 713, 726–37 (2014) (describing the “rule of reason” that was developed by the 
Supreme Court, according to which only unreasonable restraints would be considered as violation of 
the Antitrust laws). 
 255 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2018). For a description of the investigating and 
enforcing authorities of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), which is one out of the two U.S. 
agencies enforcing antitrust laws, see FED. TRADE COMM’N, A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade 
Commission’s Investigative, Law Enforcement, and Rulemaking Authority (Oct. 2019), 
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority. For an in-depth analysis of the 
enforcing tools of both the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the FTC, see 
Jonathan B. Baker, Jonathan Sallet, & Fiona Scott Morton, Unlocking Antitrust Enforcement, 127 
YALE L. J. 1916 (2018). 
 256 See McSweeny, supra note 252, at 1035–37 (“[T]he FTC has brought more than 500 cases protecting 
the privacy or security of consumer information.”). 
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generally speaking, is aimed at preventing constrains on trade.
257
  Therefore, 
antitrust laws are thus far focused on crafting prohibited commercial practices, 
which results in the accumulation of a monopolistic market power that at the 
end of the day may prevent free competition.
258
  Accordingly, the Big Five 
technology companies were initially under investigation concerning concrete 
commercial practices that traditionally fall under the auspices of antitrust law.
259
  
For example, Facebook’s practice of mass acquisition of companies, including 
major social platforms such as WhatsApp (the global messaging application 
used by more than a billion people) and Instagram, could possibly be viewed 
as a method of maintaining the company’s dominance over social media 
networks, which violates antitrust laws.  The prohibited act, then, would be the 
consolidation of social media.
260
  Yet, the byproduct of such practice 
concerning massive content monitoring and harm to the free digital speech is 
not a direct trade issue, and it does not directly concern free competition in 
the market.  Antitrust laws would traditionally be concerned by the lack of 
ability of potential competitors to enter the social media market and the 
subsequent harm done to consumers in terms of price and quality of services.  
It is doubtful whether antitrust laws, including consumer protection, could 
challenge commercial practices that pose a problem to free speech without 
 
 257 The FTC explains the underlying rationale of antitrust laws as follows: “Yet for over 100 years, the 
antitrust laws have had the same basic objective: to protect the process of competition for the benefit 
of consumers, making sure there are strong incentives for businesses to operate efficiently, keep 
prices down, and keep quality up.” FED. TRADE COMM’N, The Antitrust Laws, 
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws. 
 258 The FTC perceives its mandate as follows: “The FTC will challenge anticompetitive mergers and 
business practices that could harm consumers by resulting in higher prices, lower quality, fewer 
choices, or reduced rates of innovation. We monitor business practices, review potential mergers, 
and challenge them when appropriate to ensure that the market works according to consumer 
preferences, not illegal practices.” FED. TRADE COMM’N, What We Do, https://www.ftc.gov/about-
ftc/what-we-do. 
 259 See Jack Nicas et al., supra note 252 (discussing the investigations of antitrust issues in technology 
companies). For a discussion concerning Google’s allegedly product tying practices and comparing 
the E.U. and U.S. treatment of tying claims, see Travis Clark, Google v. Commissioner: A 
Comparison of European Union and United States Antitrust Law, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 1021 
(2017). For a more general discussion concerning online platforms commercial conduct as a 
consumer law problem, see Michael Katz & Jonathan Sallet, Multisided Platforms and Antitrust 
Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J. 2142, 2143–45 (2018). 
 260 See Jack Nicas et al., supra note 252 (“In Washington, Brussels and beyond, regulators and 
lawmakers are investigating whether the four technology companies have used their size and wealth 
to quash competition and expand their dominance.”). 
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any direct implications on trade constrains.
261
  In other words, although the 
problem that this article is challenging stems from the dominance of online 
rulers in their respective markets, it is nevertheless not a traditional antitrust 
or a consumer protection question.  The problem discussed in here is that 
these online rulers govern the democratic discourse.  Therefore, as proposed 
above, since the problem is a public law question, it should be treated by 
public law measures. 
Moreover, on a pragmatic level, the legal measure regarding hybrid bodies 
proposed to tackle the problem of content monitoring is easier and faster to 
implement.  All it takes is a judicial decision acknowledging an online ruler as 
a hybrid body and setting the concrete obligation imposed. These measures 
could be calibrated on a case-by-case basis, as the imposition of quasi-
administrative obligations would be determined by a concrete and specific 
judicial decision.  In contrast, antitrust procedures may be very long and 
complicated,
262
 could involve political players, and their final outcomes may be 
“overshooting,” such as the breakup of corporations and criminal 
procedures.
263
  Internet rulers’ activity should not be stopped but rather 
regulated.                     
CONCLUSIONS 
The digital information environment is operated by a pyramid of “in-
between” actors, known as online intermediaries.  All these online actors are 
involved in the flow of information, and thus they may function as “valves” 
that control the traffic of content in their “pipelines.”  Thus far, the control 
over the flow of information is handled by these actors with almost no 
regulation and according to their own policies driven by commercial 
considerations.  Therefore, these online intermediaries have become, in fact, 
the online rulers.  However, the issue of online content monitoring stands at 
 
 261 For a similar view, see McSweeny, supra note 252, at 1038–39 (stressing that the U.S. antitrust 
agencies are “optimized to stop practices inflicting concrete harms on consumers and competition, 
so the agency cannot address broader public interest concerns arising from the power of online 
platforms in our digital economy”). 
 262 See id. at 1034 (“[A]ntitrust cannot keep pace with rapidly evolving technology markets . . . .  
[A]ntitrust litigation can proceed slowly over the course of many years”). 
 263 For the view that the large size of media corporation has also many advantages, see Brenner, supra 
note 22, at 1027 (stressing that “[l]arger companies possess abilities that can produce greater diversity 
for society . . . . Second, large companies are often better positioned to combat government 
censorship and support First Amendment freedoms”). 
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the heart of contemporary social and legal discourse, since it challenges other 
public, individual, or commercial entities’ constitutional rights and freedoms, 
such as freedom of speech, or, more broadly, other “digital human rights.” 
Online rules are facing a new legal and social challenge since they are 
expected to strike the appropriate human rights balance despite being private 
commercial entities.  This phenomenon could be demonstrated through 
several examples concerning content monitoring in cases of allegedly 
copyright infringement, such as the legal schemes of “notice and takedown” 
or “blocking orders.”  The online rulers are expected to act as gatekeepers for 
the sake of public interest—but with no legal and social infrastructure. 
Against this background, the proposed research aims to explore whether 
and how some of the basic public law standards, such as accountability, 
transparency, equality, and reasoning, could be imposed on relevant private 
entities that are currently engaged in online content monitoring.  European 
countries, in contrast to the U.S., are more willing to accept the introduction 
of public law standards into the private law sphere.  An accepted doctrine 
acknowledges that in some cases, private entities, such as commercial 
companies that serve a social function in nature, may be perceived as a hybrid 
private/public body.  The legal consequence stemming from such perception 
is the that the door opens for the direct imposition of public law standards on 
the relevant private entity.  This article proposes that in relevant cases major 
online rulers should be acknowledged as hybrid bodies in order to promote a 
fair and balanced digital information environment.  There are many 
advantages to using this doctrine, which allows a gradual and dynamic 
application of public law principles, and on a global scale.  The challenge for 
such a potential legal move in the U.S. is greater, considering the current 
interpretation of the “state action doctrine,” which hinders the imposition of 
constitutional rights and obligations on private entities.  Nevertheless, this rigid 
approach stems from a judicial doctrine that could be relaxed by further 
judicial and legal elaborations.  The significance of this proposed research, 
therefore, lies in its potential to assist in shaping better policies and practices 
for the future—policies that can and should be initiated by the U.S. judiciary. 
In the past, the word “ruler” referred to the sovereign or the king or queen 
of a realm.  In modern democracies, the term reflects the perception that the 
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people’s will rules.264  The digital environment has become the backbone of 
democracies. Therefore, the time is ripe for online rulers to move from 




 264 See “Sovereign,” OXFORD LEXICO UK DICTIONARY, 
https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/sovereign (defining the term as “[p]ossessing supreme or 
ultimate power” and providing the example sentence that “in modern democracies the people’s will 
is in theory sovereign”). See also Cass Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 256 
(1992) (discussing the nexus between modern sovereignty and freedom of speech). 
